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The Constitution of Police Violence
Alice Ristroph I
ABSTRACT
Police force is again under scrutiny in the United States. Several recent killings of black
men by police officers have prompted an array of reform proposals, most of which seem
to assume that these recent killings were not (or should not be) authorized and legal. Our
constitutional doctrine suggests otherwise. From the 1960s to the present, federal courts
have persistently endorsed a very expansive police authority to make seizures-to stop
persons, to arrest them, and to use force. This Article reveals the full scope of this Fourth
Amendment seizure authority. Suspicion plays a critical and familiar role in authorizing
seizures, but less attention has been given to the equally important concepts of resistance
and compliance. Demands for compliance with officers and condemnations of resistance
run throughout constitutional doctrine. Police are authorized to meet resistance with
violence. Ostensibly race-neutral, the duty of compliance has in fact been distributed
along racial lines, and may be contrasted with a privilege of resistance (also race-specific)
protected elsewhere in American law. Tracing resistance and compliance helps reveal the
ways in which the law distributes risks of violence, and it may help inspire new proposals
to reduce and redistribute those risks. Instead of condemning all resistance, constitutional
doctrine could and should protect certain forms of non-violent resistance both in police
encounters and in later court proceedings. Embracing resistance could help constrain
police authority and mitigate racial disparities in criminal justice, and surprisingly enough,
it may yet reduce violence.
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INTRODUCTION
Blue lights in the rearview mirror are familiar to every American with a
driver's license. Most of us have obeyed the signal and pulled over, unhappy
though we may be about it. A bullet from a service revolver, however, is not
something that many of us ever expect to receive. Though police killings remain
relatively rare events, they are arguably not rare enough, especially for persons of
color.' Deaths of unarmed black men at the hands of officers have gripped the
nation's attention for the past few years. These killings are widely, though not
universally, condemned. But the condemnations typically focus on the moment
of killing-on the specific choice to use deadly force-and not on the police
activity that preceded it. That narrow focus has contributed to the misconception
that the killings are the anomalous, unauthorized acts of rogue officers. Against
that view, this Article shows that the same legal framework that authorizes and
normalizes the ordinary traffic stop also permits and even encourages killings of
unarmed suspects.
One constitutional word-seizures-encompasses a wide range of police
activity, from the brief investigative stop short of a fil arrest, all the way to the
killing of a suspect. And one other word-unreasonable-is all that the constitu-
tional text itself offers to distinguish licit from illicit seizures.' Across the spectrum
of police seizures from stops to shootings, reasonableness is doctrinally defined
almost exclusively in terms of just two criteria: suspicion and nonsubmission.4
Suspicion of any legal violation, even a civil offense, is sufficient to justify at least
1. It is difficult to obtain reliable data on police killings. Investigations by the Washington Post and the
Guardian identified, respectively, 965 and 1134 deaths at the hands of law enforcement officers in
the United States in 2015. The Post study focused specifically on shootings, rather than all killings,
which may account for the lower number. See Kimberly Kindy et al., A Year ofReckoning. Police
Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2015), http-//www.washingtonpost
.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000
[http://perma.cc/L8XQ-Q7LQ; Jon Swaine et al., Young Black Men Killed by US Police at Highest
Rate in Year of 1,134 Deaths, GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/the-counted-police-killings-2015-young-black-men [http://perma.cc
/4VR3-6H34]. As the Post noted, its reported total is more than double the average number of
annual police shootings reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but the FBI and
other federal agencies have conceded that their recordkeeping has been inadequate. See Kindy et
al., supra. Black men constitute about six percent of the U.S. population, but they represented
about 40 percent of the unarmed men shot by police in 2015. Id
2. See sources cited supra note 1.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."). This Article focuses
on seizures of persons, but of course the Fourth Amendment also regulates seizures of property.
4. See infra Parts I.B, I.C.
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an investigative stop, and greater levels of suspicion justify longer or more intrusive
seizures.s Once police have made an initial seizure, even if just a brief investi-
gative stop, nonsubmission by the suspect gives the police authority to use force.'
Indeed, actual nonsubmission is not even a prerequisite to the use of force. An
officer who suspects nonsubmission-which may mean that the officer believes
that the person seized may resist with violence, or otherwise may pose a danger to
the officer or others, or simply isn't cooperating-becomes empowered to use
force against that person, even if the officer is mistaken.! Importantly, race is at
once central and irrelevant to this suspicion and nonsubmission formula. It is
central because officers' beliefs that a person is suspicious (or nonsubmissive)
seem at least partly determined by race in many instances.' But racialized moti-
vations are mostly irrelevant to the formal authority to make a seizure. Whenever
an officer can identify objective grounds for suspicion-a broken taillight, for
example-the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure even if the officer's choice
to stop this particular driver is contingent on the suspect's race.9
To make these general doctrinal rules more concrete, think of the now-
familiar pattern that characterizes many highly publicized recent killings. The
encounter begins with a seemingly minor police intervention: a traffic stop, an
order by the officer to stop walking in the street, an arrest for a petty offense such
as selling loose cigarettes.10 The suspect is insufficiently cooperative, or perhaps
5. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (stating that suspicion of a civil traffic code
violation is sufficient to justify a stop); see also infra Part I.A.
6. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect
it."); see also infra Part I.C.
7. See, e.g., Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that use of deadly force against
an unarmed suspect who was trying to comply with police orders did not, as a matter of law, violate
the Fourth Amendment, given the officer's reasonable but mistaken belief that the suspect could be
reaching for a gun); see also infra Part I.C.
8. See infra Part IlA
9. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975)
(finding unconstitutional a traffic stop based only on "apparent Mexican ancestry," but stating that
"Mexican appearance" could serve as one factor among others to establish reasonable suspicion of
an immigration violation). As discussed in Part HA, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that
racially targeted policing may violate other provisions of the federal constitution, such as the Equal
Protection Clause, even if such policing does not violate the Fourth Amendment. To date,
though, most constitutional challenges to racial profiling have failed in court, regardless of the
constitutional provisions invoked. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling:A Critique
of the Economics Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More
Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275, 1278 (2004) (noting that "practically all constitutional
challenges to racial profiling," if actually adjudicated, have failed due to "technical legal
distinctions").
10. In July 2014, Eric Garner was killed in New York City by Officer Daniel Pantaleo as Pantaleo tried
to arrest Garner for selling loose cigarettes. The following month, Michael Brown was shot and
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only apparently noncooperative." The officer asserts greater authority, the
seizure quickly escalates, and the officer concludes that he is in danger. He kills
the suspect. Later it is discovered that the suspect was unarmed. In many cases,
there is public condemnation of the officer, and in some cases, an effort to indict
or prosecute. Even if a prosecutor does pursue charges, the officer is likely to
avoid conviction.
As this pattern has repeated itself, there has been surprisingly little attention
to the constitutional rules that set the boundaries of seizure authority. Some
commentators have sought to understand why prosecutions of officers fail and
what legal reforms might make prosecutions successful, but the proposed reforms
take the constitutional framework for granted.12 Other commentators have
looked for alternative methods to reduce violence, such as training officers to
de-escalate or to be aware of implicit biases that may distort the decision to use
force.' Still other work simply attempts to determine whether racial bias actually
drives use-of-force decisions.' 4 These efforts to understand and address police
killed in Ferguson, Missouri by Officer Darren Wilson after Wilson had ordered Brown to stop
walking in the street. In April 2015, Walter Scott was killed in North Charleston, South Carolina
by Officer Michael Slager, who had pulled Scott's car over because it had a broken brake light. For
further discussion of these cases, see infra Part I.
11. Garner, Brown, and Scott, discussed in supra note 10, each reportedly attempted to flee or resist in
some way. Garner's resistance and Scott's flight are documented on bystanders' videos. Brown's
resistance is more disputed; some witnesses described him as putting his hands up in apparent
surrender just before he was shot. Other witnesses described an attempt to hit or charge at the
officer, and the Department of Justice report on Brown's killing concluded that the evidence of
resistance was at least good enough to preclude a prosecution of the police officer. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON,
MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 27-36 (2015).
12. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall ofSilence: How to Challenge
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CI. LEGAL F. 213 (describing legal barriers to
investigations of police violence and interrogations of police officers, and suggesting ways in which
tort and contract law could be used to challenge these barriers to investigation); Kate Levine, Wh.o
Shouldn't Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016) (applying conflict-of-interest
principles to argue that local prosecutors should not have authority over prosecutions of police
officers).
13. Funded by the U.S. Department ofJustice, the Fair and Impartial Policing project aims to address
and ameliorate implicit bias in federal and state law enforcement. See FAIR & IMPARTIAL
POLICING, httpJ//www.fairandimpartialpolicing.com [http://perma.cc/8F83-SK72]; see also FAIR
& IMPARTIAL POLICING, TRAINING RESOURCES SECTION (2017), https://staticl.squarespace
.com/static/54722818e4b0b3ef26cdc085/t/58759865e3df289e72236b94/1484101734777/Extend
edAbout+FlP_2017%24.pdf[https-//perma.cc/VAT5-L9DQJ.
14. See, e.g., PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICING EQUlTY, THE SCIENCE OF
JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE OF FORCE (2016) (finding disproportionate use of
force against blacks, even after controlling for arrest rates); Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical
Analysis ofRacial Differences in Police Use ofForce (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 22399, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22399.pdf [https//perma.cc/6R7F-9ZS9]
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violence have, by and large, identified either individual officers or police de-
partments as the most important decisionmakers; they have not focused on, or
faulted, the constitutional doctrine that defines the scope of the officers' authority.s
In other words, the usual critiques of police shootings operate on the underlying
assumption that the officer who chose to shoot made a bad choice against a
backdrop of reasonable, if somewhat indeterminate, legal guidelines.'" Respon-
sibility for the killings is placed with the officers (or, in the view of the officers'
defenders, with the noncompliant suspects) and not with the constitutional doc-
trine that structures police authority, nor with the people who have crafted that
doctrine, nor with The People on whose behalf the doctrine is said to be crafted.
This focus on the officer overlooks what it is sometimes called the constitutive
function of constitutional law. The U.S. Constitution is literally constitutive in
that it specifies the structure and powers of various institutions, calling them into
being and shaping institutional actions in important ways." And constitutional
doctrine is constitutive in a slightly more metaphorical sense as well; it expresses
core political. principles and a narrative of political continuity.'" It shapes our un-
derstandings of community and citizenship." Consider these constitutive and
(finding blacks more likely to be subject to non-lethal force, but finding no racial bias in the use of
deadly force).
15. A number of commentators urge more federal investigations of local police departments. This
approach recognizes a problem that extends beyond individual "rogue officers," but still faults the
police rather than other actors within the legal system. See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, Using Data to
Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 122-25 (2016) (proposing ways to use new datasets to
support federal civil rights investigations of police departments). For a rare commentary that links
police killings to broader principles of constitutional doctrine, see Matthew Segal, Beyond
#BlackLivesMatter: Police Reform Must Be Bolsteredby LegalAction, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2016, 7:00
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/27/beyond-black-lives-matter-police
-reform-legal-action [httpi//perma.cc/9NFH-2F6B].
16. For many years, beginning long before the recent spate of police killings, those who do examine the
constitutional rules for the use of force have characterized them as indeterminate. See, e.g., Rachel
A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2008) (describing
use of force doctrine as "unprincipled" and "indeterminate"); William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter
the Terror, 111 YALE LJ. 2137, 2141 (2002) ("Right now, Fourth Amendment law devotes an
enormous amount of attention to thefact of searches and seizures, but almost none to how those
searches and seizures are carried out.").
17. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE LJ. 408, 417 (2007).
18. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 182 (1999)
("Constitutional law creates the people of the United States as apeople by providing a narrative that
connects us to everyone who preceded us.").
19. As Monica Bell observes, the stakes are high in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, even higher
than the individual liberty interests and law enforcement needs that courts typically recite. The
stakes are high precisely because of the expressive function of constitutional law. "Because of the
longstanding social, cultural, and symbolic meaning of the police among African Americans and in
racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities, policing cases-more than others-send
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expressive functions in relation to the police. As a formal matter, the Constitution
does not itself empower (or even mention) police departments or police officers,
but only sets limits to the powers granted to the police by state law or other
sources.20 As a practical matter, though, most American jurisdictions empower
officers to the full limits of constitutional doctrine-and even when they do not,
officers face few sanctions for conduct that violates state law but falls within the
range of federal constitutional permissibility.2 Thus doctrinal choices shape police
practices, as courts are well aware. And the courts' role extends beyond setting
the outer parameters of permissible conduct. Constitutional doctrine is rife with
normative evaluations of the police, sometimes condemning officers but more
often expressing gratitude to them, respect for the risks officers bear, and deference
to the choices they make.22 It is difficult to know whether judicial opining on the
police has shaped any specific officer's decisions, but this much is dear: The officers
who have killed unarmed black men in recent years have, in several instances,
been engaged in exactly the kinds of policing anticipated and even celebrated by
constitutional doctrine. Though constitutional doctrine is but one of many
factors that shape American policing, it is a factor that cannot be overlooked by
those who wish to understand and ameliorate police violence.
This Article thus resists the suggestion that constitutional rules for the use
of force are too indeterminate to be relevant. The constitutional law of basic
seizures, such as stops and arrests, is not indeterminate. Rather, the doctrine
quite clearly authorizes these seizures when police have minimal levels of suspicion.
If a suspect resists-if he flees, if he squirms, if he kicks, if he twists away-the
authorization to escalate a basic seizure with a use of force is fairly explicit as well.
When flight or resistance is coupled with a threat of danger (and flight or
resistance is often treated as itself evidence of dangerousness), deadly force is
permitted. Scholars have not confronted this aspect of seizure doctrine, but we
messages about social inclusion and, indeed, social citizenship." Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and
the Dismantling ofLegalEstrangement, 126 YALE LJ. 2054,2140 (2017).
20. Cf Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963) (stating that lawfulness of an arrest by a state officer
for a state offense is to be determined by state law, subject to federal constitutional limits). Police
departments as we know them today did not exist at the time the U.S. Constitution and the U.S.
Bill of Rights were drafted and adopted, and neither the Fourth Amendment nor any other
constitutional provision was designed as an authorization or regulation of police officers. Alice
Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95
B.U. L. REv. 1555, 1557-58 (2015).
21. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (finding that an arrest in violation of state law does not
necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment); id at 174 (noting that Virginia has chosen "not to
attach to violations of its arrest rules the potent remedies that federal courts have applied to Fourth
Amendment violations"); see also infra Part I.
22. For examples, see infra Part I.
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should: The constitutional law of police force is not indeterminate, but determi-
nately permissive.
The law of police force is constitutive and permissive; it is also distributive.
Laws that regulate violence-including self-defense doctrine, the laws of war,
and the constitutional law of seizures-never eliminate violence entirely. Instead,
these areas of law distribute or redistribute the risks of being subjected to violence,
a point underscored by the contemporary refrains that Black (or Blue) Lives
Matter. To elaborate with one example, a self-defense doctrine that grants private
individuals broad prerogatives to use force against perceived threats may decrease
the risks of violence to some persons but increase the risks that others-persons
likely to be perceived as threatening-will suffer harm." That was the observation
of many critics after Bernie Goetz was acquitted for shooting unarmed black
youths in a New York subway car, and the idea resurfaced after George
Zimmerman was acquitted for shooting an unarmed Trayvon Martin.24 Indeed,
it was in response to Zimmerman's acquittal, and not a police shooting, that
"Black Lives Matter" was first introduced as a call for activism.25 Importantly, the
distributive effects of laws of violence are not necessarily zero-sum. That is, some
legal rules may increase risks of violence on one group without a proportional
decrease in risk to another group. It is doubtful whether Fourth Amendment
doctrine's permissiveness of police violence maximizes officer safety or public
safety, and the broad authority to use force clearly puts suspects in peril.
23. In a few recent papers, Aya Gruber has examined the distributive effects of criminal justice policies,
focusing on the distribution of harms and benefits broadly defined rather than specifically on the
distribution of violence. See Aya Gruber, ADistributive Theory ofCriminalLaw, 52 WM. &MARY
L. REv. 1 (2010); Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical
Criminal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 3211 (2015). Beyond self-defense doctrine,
another legal effort to redistribute violence is the soldier-civilian distinction that is central to the
laws of war. It aims to decrease risks of violence to civilians, but it also increases risks to soldiers.
The uniform requirement helps shield from violence those who do not wear uniforms, and at the
same time marks those in uniform as legitimate targets. Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of
Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 115, 117 (2010) (discussing "the tradeoff that the law seeks to
induce-sacrificing the lives of soldiers to protect the lives of civilians").
24. George Zimmerman shot Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black teenager, in Sanford, Florida in
2012, and was acquitted of homicide charges the following year. Audra D.S. Burch et al, George
Zimmerman Not Guilty in Murder ofTrayvon Martin, MIAMI HERALD (July 13,2013,10:04 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/trayvon-martin/artidel953237.htnl
[http://perma.cc/S5TJ-LXD9]; see Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists,
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negraphobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 783-84 (1994)
(discussing the trials of Goetz and of the officers who beat Rodney King and suggesting that racial
stereotypes underlie many determinations that fear of black males is "reasonable").
25. See Alicia Garza, A Herstory ofthe #BlackLivesMatter Movement by Alicia Garza, FEMINIST WIRE
(Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2 [http-//perma.cc
/KU89-HRDK].
1189
64 UCLA L. REv. 1182 (2017)
To reduce or redistribute th'e risks of violence during police encounters, it is
probably necessary to rethink the two broad criteria for reasonable seizures: sus-
picion and nonsubmission. It is worth asking, for example, whether suspicion of
any legal violation merits a forcible police intervention. Instead of prosecuting
police officers, we might ask them to do less-to give up on protecting the country
from the scourge of broken taillights, for example, and to focus more narrowly on
addressing the most serious forms of criminal conduct. That suggestion is not
novel; a number of critics have decried the ease with which suspicion thresholds
are satisfied and the resulting broad scope of police discretion." But this Article
adds to prior critiques by showing that the costs of low suspicion thresholds are
not merely the intrusions of stop-and-frisks, but also civilian lives, especially the
lives of those civilians most likely to be deemed suspicious.
More controversial than a call to rethink the constitutional doctrine of sus-
picion, I suspect, will be this Article's recommendation to reevaluate the doctrinal
significance of resistance or nonsubmission. Police officers should be obeyed, the
orthodox view holds, and their authority should not be questioned except by
after-the-fact litigation that gives courts, not suspects, the final word.27 Espe-
cially in the wake of the murders of several Dallas and Baton Rouge officers in
the summer of2016, any allowance for resistance may seem unwise. 2  But today's
blanket condemnation of resistance toward officers cloaks a more complicated
national history, one that celebrates-selectively-individual rights to refuse
compliance with oppressive state agents. When viewed alongside the common
law right to resist unlawful arrest once widely recognized in the United States,
and next to the recently resurgent Second Amendment right to bear arms, the
Fourth Amendment's treatment of resistance as a license for officers to use force
seems less self-evident, and perhaps, less defensible.29 At the very least, we
should identify and defend the distributive implications of our rules of resistance;
26. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Betueen Criminal Procedure and Criminal
justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1997) ("In a world where trivial crimes stay on the books, or one where
routine traffic offenses count as crimes, the requirement of probable cause ... may mean almost
nothing.").
27. Even after-the-fact litigation may not present opportunities to question police authority, since
courts often defer to officers'judgments. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135
S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) ("Courts must not judge officers with 'the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'
(quoting Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002))). For further discussion, see
infra Part II.B.
28. See Joe Mozingo, Deadly Attacks in Dallas and Baton Rouge Echo a More Dangerous Timefor Police,
L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://wwwlatimes.com/nation/la-na-baton-rouge-
history-20160717-snap-story.html [http://perma.cc/2MGG-SFBQJ.
29. See infra Part I.B.
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we should be honest about who has the privilege to resist and who bears the
burdens of compliance, or the burdens of others' fears of noncompliance.
Part I of this Article introduces the constitutional law of police violence. It
shows how the doctrine grants officers broad powers to stop or arrest, and how
easily the power to stop becomes the power to use force, even deadly force. This
Part focuses, as does the doctrine, on suspicion and nonsubmission, with particular
emphasis on the concept of officer safety and the condemnation of all resistance
to the police. Part II examines the ways these doctrinal rules affect the distribution
ofviolence. This Part considers first race and then resistance, though each of these
themes is bound up with the other. Two points bear emphasis. First, Fourth
Amendment suspicion standards have been adopted, and lowered, with open
acknowledgment of the burdens these standards will impose on persons of color.
Second, the near-categorical demand for compliance with the police contrasts
sharply with America's venerations of an individual right to resist government
oppression, making the resistance right appear, still in the twenty-first century, as
a race-specific privilege. Part III contemplates possibilities for escape via adjust-
ments to the suspicion and nonsubmission framework. It will not be easy. Recent
incidents of police violence are the products of deeply embedded constitutional
choices-constitutive choices that shape the core political narratives of the
nation. Rethinking those choices may prove even more difficult, though also
more important, than convicting a police officer for killing a suspect.
I. THE SHORT BLUE LINE FROM STOP TO SHOTS
In 1976, a Dallas police officer stopped a car for a simple safety violation and"
was rewarded with a fatal gunshot. At dosing arguments in the subsequent murder
trial, the prosecutor characterized the police as "the thin blue line" that separated
civilized society from anarchy. With more than a touch of irony, filmmaker Errol
Morris later used that phrase as the title of a documentary that explores claims
that police and prosecutorial misconduct led an innocent man to be sentenced to
death for the Dallas officer's murder." But consider the phrase "the thin blue
line" without irony. If police at their best should be understood as a necessary
barrier separating safe, organized society from violent chaos, the implications
may be unsettling. The image of the thin blue line suggests that police do not
themselves operate wholly within democratic society. The police officer, like the
30. THE THIN BLUE LINE (American Playhouse 1988). After the release of Morris's documentary,
the case was reexamined and the defendant, Randall Dale Harris, was eventually exonerated. SeeJ.
Michael Kennedy & Daniel Cerone, Conviction Set Aside for Thin Blue Line Character, LA
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1989, at Al.
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soldier or correctional officer or anyone else whose livelihood involves wielding
physical force on behalf of the state, always stands at the periphery of civilized,
law-bound society, and on that periphery, keeps one foot in a world ofviolence.
Thus, one implication of "the thin blue line" is a reminder that the modem
police officer is an agent of violence. Using force is not, of course, the only thing
that police do. Officers direct traffic and crowds, they patrol streets, they help
people who have literally or metaphorically lost their way, and they, like the rest
of us, do far too much paperwork. All the same, the power to use force is one of
the defining attributes of the modem police officer."' What portion of police ac-
tivity may be characterized as forceful or violent depends on the definitions of
those terms. I shall suggest below that police violence is a far wider category than
typically recognized. And even when an officer is not using force, he carries with
him the authority to use it. That authorization colors even the gentlest police
interactions with individuals, and it ensures that many of these interactions will
quickly become ungentle.
The imagery of the thin blue line was almost certainly intended to emphasize
not officers' violence, but rather their vulnerability.32 As this Part will show,
however, the two are closely linked. Fourth Amendment law places great
importance on officer safety, and its usual strategy to protect officers is to expand
police authority to use force. An alternative approach, one that would protect
officers by minimizing officer-civilian contacts and conflicts, is markedly absent
from constitutional doctrine. Constitutional doctrine has steadily expanded the
occasions in which it permits and even encourages police to interrupt, detain, and
take custody of ordinary citizens. As police are asked to do more, they have been
empowered to use more force, especially if they sense danger. The result is a dif-
ferent line, noticeable more for its shortness than its thinness-the line from an
initial police-civilian encounter to an officer's authorization to use deadly force.
This Part traces that line, beginning with the doctrinal definition of a seizure and
then examining the two simple criteria-suspicion and nonsubmission-that
31. Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police, in THE
POTENTIAL FOR REFORM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 17, 35 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974) ("[P]olice
work consists of coping with problems in which force may have to be used.").
32. The phrase is a play on "the thin red line," used to describe the British army at the Battle of
Balaclava in the Crimean War, and referring more broadly to a vulnerable military unit standing
fast. See JULIAN SPILSBURY, THE THIN RED LINE: AN EYEWITNESS HISTORY OF.THE
CRIMEAN WAR (2005). Metaphors got mixed-lines got crossed, as it were-in 2012 and 2013,
when President Obama initially proclaimed that Syria would cross "a red line" and necessitate
American military intervention if it used chemical weapons, but he later proved reluctant to
commit arguably overstretched American forces to another war. See Dexter Filkins, The Thin Red
Line, NEW YORKER (May 13, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/13/the-
thin-red-line-2 [http://perma.cc/U3KN-V6A9].
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render a seizure reasonable. To put it simply, constitutional doctrine has simul-
taneously invited officers (1) to increase radically their potentially contentious
investigative encounters, and (2) to prefer their own safety to the safety of the
persons they investigate.
A. What Counts as a Seizure
To the extent that police violence is regulated by the federal constitution, it
is regulated by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable seizures."
As noted in the Introduction, the word seizure is applied to a wide range of police
interventions, from short conversation to brutal beating to killing. It is important
to understand how constitutional doctrine defines the term seizure-not only to
see what counts as a seizure, but also to see what does not. Constitutional doctrine
constructs police authority, and it sometimes accomplishes this end by declining
to intervene in a contested police practice rather than by imposing constraints.
The continuum that leads from initial intervention to deadly force often begins
with encounters not formally classified as seizures at all.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .""
To resolve a Fourth Amendment claim, a court can adjudicate the noun (search
or seizure), or it can adjudicate the adjective (unreasonable).34 The first kind of
adjudication does not seem to require the court to make an all-things-considered
assessment of the state conduct, it does not require explicit endorsement or con-
demnation. It is a category assessment, and if the challenged conduct falls outside
the category, the adjudicative task ends." Or so the linguistic structure of the
Fourth Amendment suggests. In fact, however, Fourth Amendment decisions
reveal that the classification of police conduct as a seizure is a normative choice,
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" creates a similar
adjudicative structure. An Eighth Amendment claim may be dispensed with by finding that the
state action does not constitute "punishment" at all, or by finding that the instant punishment is not
"cruel and unusual." See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139,
163-70(2006).
35. As a practical matter, judges may be more inclined to find that an action is not a seizure (or not a
punishment), if they also believe the action is not unreasonable or cruel. Occasionally, though, we
see judges using the constitutional noun to refrain from regulating otherwise objectionable conduct.
See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that the Eighth Amendment should not apply to a prisoner-on-prisoner attack, since
"[c]onditions of confinement are not punishment in any recognized sense of the term, unless
imposed as part of a sentence").
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one sometimes driven less by formalistic definitions than by a judgment that the
police should be free to engage in the challenged conduct.
"[Wihenevera police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."36 So announced the U.S. Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio," the 1968 opinion that contemplates, and ultimately
permits, brief investigative stops and the frisks for weapons that often accompany
such stops.38 Terry is famous for its authorization of police activity that is not
justified by probable cause, and not for its definition of a seizure; later cases gave
more specific content to Terry's "restraint of freedom" standard.39 But Terry was
an important beginning to seizure doctrine nonetheless. As ChiefJustice Warren's
opinion noted, some argued that a frisk did not amount to a search, nor a stop to a
seizure, and on this view stops and frisks should not be prohibited nor even
addressed by Fourth Amendment law at all.4 The Court rejected this claim
without much discussion, finding a stop to be a restraint of freedom and thus a
seizure, and moving to what might be called adjectival analysis-a discussion of
the circumstances under which a stop-and-frisk is reasonable.41 Nominally, then,
the Court purported to regulate stops and frisks, identifying the conditions of
permissibility. As decades of experience have shown, however, "reasonable sus-
picion" as a regulatory standard has posed almost no obstacle to police officers.42
Terry launched seizure doctrine with an illustration that the Fourth Amendment,
and judicial review, could legitimize police activity rather than curtail it.
But the invitation extended in Terry-to permit or even endorse police
activity by declaring it outside the Fourth Amendment altogether-was not
forgotten. The Court took a rain check, and redeemed it in later cases that
narrowed the definition of seizure and found some police conduct outside of that
definition. Later decisions clarified that the "restraint of freedom" standard
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 30-31. After observing two men pace around a store and speak to a third man, and believing
them to be preparing to rob the store, Officer Martin McFadden approached the men, asked their
names, and then frisked all three, finding guns on two of the three suspects. Id at 5-7.
39. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).
40. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as 'stop' and 'frisk' that
such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action rises
to the level of a 'search' or 'seizure' within the meaning of the Constitution. We emphatically reject
this notion." (footnote omitted)).
41. Id at 16-18. As later cases noted, the Terry Court focused primarily on the frisk, and did not offer
much discussion of a stop as an independent police action. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552-53
(plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).
42. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. LJ. 329, 355-56 (2013) (noting the concern
that under Terry, "law enforcement officials will push any license to (or past) the limits of its logic,"
and arguing that the concern is "validated by New York City's stop-and-frisk experience").
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should take into account the totality of the circumstances and the perspective of a
reasonable person: "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."43
Furthermore, a seizure has a causation element: The subject's perception that his
freedom has been restrained must be the product of police force or a show of
authority." With this refined doctrinal standard, the Court effectively introduced a
new classification of police activity, one I will call the near-seizure.
The near-seizure is a police-initiated encounter with an individual which
the individual experiences as coercive, and which is designed to uncover criminal
activity and lead to an arrest, but which courts find to lie completely outside the
Fourth Amendment. To illustrate: A traveler is approached on an airport
concourse by federal agents, who identify themselves, ask a few questions, and
then ask the traveler to accompany them to a Drug Enforcement Agency office
within the airport. In the office, agents ask to search the traveler's person and
bags, and ask her to remove her clothing. Drugs are discovered, of course, and
when the traveler later alleges a Fourth Amendment violation, the Court finds
that no seizure occurred, since a reasonable traveler would have felt free to decline
the agents' requests as soon as they approached her on the concourse, and
throughout the encounter to the point of the strip search.45 This is a near-seizure,
and it is a category of police activity as important as the investigative stop.
Courts would probably resist the label "near-seizure." As a formal doctrinal
matter, these encounters lie beyond Fourth Amendment protection precisely
because they are voluntary." But a study of police force must take note of this
type of interaction, because it is, by design and in practical effect, a typical precursor
to the use of force. Again, the near-seizure is police-initiated, intended to furnish
grounds for an arrest or at least a stop (either of which is a seizure, of course), and
often experienced as coercive by the subject of investigation. The airport investi-
gation described above fits this category, as do bus sweeps, which have become a
43. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). It is not clear that this standard can
be applied in a race-neutral way, since the reasonable perception of freedom to leave may vary
considerably among suspects of different races. See infra notes 128, 184-185 and accompaying text.
44. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).
45. This scenario occurred in Mendenhall. See id at 555.
46. The line between what courts find to be voluntary and what they find to be a seizure is murky.
Mendenhall denied that the DEA agents had seized the traveler. Id at 558 (majority opinion). In
another airport narcotics interdiction case with almost identical facts, a plurality of the Court found
a seizure. Floridav. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983) (plurality opinion).
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"routine drug and weapons interdiction" strategy.47 In a typical bus sweep, police
officers board a bus just before its scheduled departure and question passengers,
usually seeking consent to search luggage. Like the airport interdictions, these
sweeps mostly lie outside the Fourth Amendment now, since the Court has
rejected the claim that the interaction is necessarily coercive. 48 The Court
has specifically rejected a requirement that officers tell bus passengers of their
right to refuse consent, holding that cooperation with the police can be "voluntary"
even in the absence of such a warning.49
Bus sweeps illustrate that a judgment that police action is not a seizure may
rest more on normative assessments of the desirability of the action and less on
the formal doctrinal definition of a seizure. Indeed, the Court has sometimes
acknowledged that passengers on a bus probably do not feel free to leave as an
officer approaches them, but has said that this is due to the nature of bus travel
and is not the product of government coercion.so It is hard to imagine why a drug
courier would agree to be searched (as many do), knowing full well what the
search will yield, unless he believed that he was not free to leave or resist. The
Court's response to this point-that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with
the perspective of innocent personss-is mostly nonresponsive, unless there is
some reason to believe that law-violators are unusually and unreasonably deferential
to police, which seems unlikely.52 More plausibly, innocent and guilty alike
47. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002). A third example of a near-seizure is the
"factory survey," or workplace raid, conducted by immigration enforcement officials in search of
undocumented persons. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
48. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04 (finding no seizure after three armed officers boarded a bus, one
officer stationed himself at each end of the bus, and the third officer questioned passengers
individually about travel plans and asked permission to search luggage); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 436 (1991) (noting that passengers awaiting an impending bus departure are unlikely to feel
"free to leave" regardless of police presence, and holding that whether a seizure occurred in the bus
sweep context depends on "whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter").
49. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-05.
50. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
51. Id at 437-38. As discussed further below, the Court's frequent insistence that the Fourth
Amendment is a protection for the innocent rather than the guilty stands in sharp contrast to Fifth
Amendment doctrine, which cannot avoid the reality that a privilege against self-incrimination is a
protection for those likely to incriminate themselves, including but not limited to the actually
guilty.
52. A useful exercise is to imagine the same encounter, but remove both drugs/contraband and
uniforms/badges. If a trio of private citizens were to board a bus, take positions at the front and
rear, announce that they were looking for someone, and proceed to question passengers one at a
time, it is at least possible that (fully innocent) passengers could perceive themselves to be held by
force or threat. If the individuals accosting the bus passengers carry visible weapons, as police
conducting bus sweeps typically do, the perception of force is even more likely. Now put the
badges back-it seems possible and even likely that the officers' status as police only increases the
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experience bus sweeps as coercive, and reasonably so. Non-white suspects may
be especially likely to feel that they are "not free to leave" when approached by law
enforcement officer, on a bus or otherwise.53 But bus sweeps have been charac-
terized as "necessary" to the war on drugs-including in briefs and oral arguments
to the Supreme Court.54 The Court's assertion that the demands of the war on
drugs bore little on its classification of a bus sweep as a nonseizure seems to protest
too much.ss
Thus far, I have identified near-seizures that involve individuals who submit
to the police and whose submission courts find to be voluntary. A second category
of near-seizures involves individuals who do not submit, but rather attempt to
flee. Even after police have issued a command to stop that would otherwise
qualify as the initiation of a seizure, no doctrinally recognized seizure begins until
the individual has submitted or the police have made intentional physical contact.s6
Of course, a reasonable person probably would not feel free to leave once an
officer has commanded him to stop, but the Court has amended its initial
definition to clarify that the reasonable person's perception of a restraint on her
freedom is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of a seizure.s7 Thus, an
individual who runs after a command to stop has not been seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. One important practical consequence of
this rule is that a suspect who discards evidence in flight cannot later suppress it,
degree to which passengers will feel compelled to submit Cf DAVID COLE, No EQUAL
* JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20 (1999)
(discussing the coercion inherent in police encounters).
53. See Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 976-86
(2002) (discussing Bostick and racial minorities' heightened vulnerability to police encounters).
54. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (No. 89-1717), 1990 WL 10013127, at
*8. Though Bostick was not federal prosecution, the federal government was sufficiently invested in
the outcome of the case to have Solicitor General Kenneth Starr participate in oral argument, and
Starr emphasized the growing prevalence of bus sweeps as a "natural outgrowth" of airport drug
interdictions. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (No. 89-1717), 1991 WL
636581, at *19.
55. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
56. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (holding that even after a showing of police
authority or exercise of force, no seizure occurs if the subject does not yield); Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) ("[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur ... whenever
there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual's freedom
of movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied."). Physical contact with a fleeing suspect creates a
seizure only if police intend the specific form and manner of contact. Thus, a police vehicle's high-
speed pursuit of a motorcycle, which ended in a crash that killed a passenger on the motorcycle, was
not a seizure. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998). In contrast, a vehicle
crash deliberately orchestrated by police is a seizure (and not necessarily an unreasonable one). See,
e.g., Scottv. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 385-86 (2007).
57. HodariD., 499 U.S. at 628.
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even if the police lacked any justification for the initial order to stop." More
broadly, the denial of Fourth Amendment protection to a fleeing suspect intro-
duces the doctrinal disapproval of resistance. A suspect who fails to comply with
an officer's command is penalized with the loss of the Fourth Amendment
protection that would otherwise apply. And while flight denies the. suspect
constitutional protections in some circumstances, it nearly always expands the
police officer's power. The very act of attempting to avoid police is a factor that
helps establish the suspicion necessary to justify a stop, should the police not yet
have that suspicion.59 As discussed below, flight or resistance also gives the officer
authority to use at least some degree of force. 60
This last point takes us from the noun to the adjective: Once police activity
is categorized as a seizure, the precise scope of police authority is a question of
reasonableness, which in turn is determined by suspicion and nonsubmission.
Before we examine those criteria in the next two sections, it is worth pausing to
emphasize the implications of the narrow doctrinal definition of a seizure. This
Subpart has shown that the label "seizure" applies only to encounters in which (1)
a reasonable person would feel coerced, with reasonableness and coercion judicially
determined, and (2) the target actually submits or is overpowered. Given this
doctrinal definition, many police-civilian encounters are left outside the Fourth
Amendment altogether. Federal courts have not been neutral or indifferent to
those encounters; instead, they have repeatedly endorsed them. Terry and a long
line of cases after it explicitly encouraged the police to approach people, to ask
them questions, to seek permission to search their persons or their belong-
ings-even in the absence of any reason to suspect them of wrongdoing.6 1 In-
58. Id at 629. The Court suggested that its ruling (no seizure until submission) was justified in part by
the need to incentivize submission to police orders: "Street pursuits always place the public at some
risk, and compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be encouraged." Id at 627.
59. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) ("[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor
in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act
of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such."
(citations omitted)). Officers regularly cite evasive or furtive movements as the basis of reasonable
suspicion, and have cited that factor more frequently over time. See Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda
Geller, Following the Script. Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 51, 78-79 (2015).
60. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the
right to use some degree ofphysical coercion or threat thereofto effect it.").
61. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) ("Even when law enforcement officers
have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification,
and request consent to search luggage rovided they do not induce cooperation by coercive
means."); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
J.) (denying that police-citizen encounters are necessarily intrusive and claiming that to characterize
every "street encounter" as a seizure would "impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide
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deed, courts characterize these encounters as healthy collaborations rather than
oppressive interventions.62 Oppressiveness would render the encounter a seizure,
of course, but in the judicial view, there is no inherent coercion or oppression
when an officer interrupts a civilian with a request for cooperation. Consequently,
in airports, buses, streets, and elsewhere, the volume of police-initiated encounters,
from near-seizures to Terry stops, has expanded dramatically.63 To understand
police killings of civilians, it is important to begin at the beginning, with the initial
police intervention, and to note how easily and often that intervention is made.
B. What Makes a Seizure Reasonable: Suspicion
If we narrow our focus from all police-initiated encounters with civilians to
the subset of those encounters formally recognized as seizures, the critical doctrinal
word becomes the adjective. What makes a seizure reasonable? In the context of
searches, "reasonable" used to be interpreted to mean "pursuant to a warrant," but
the warrant "requirement" or "preference" was never applied as consistently to
seizures.64 Absent warrant requirements, reasonableness is nominally assessed
variety of legitimate law enforcement practices"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (suggesting
that it would be "poor police work indeed" to fail to stop Mr. Terry).
62. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) ("[P]olice questioning, by itself, is unlikely to
result in a Fourth Amendment violation. While most citizens will respond to a police request, the
fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates
the consensual nature of the response.").
63. The numbers are hard to verify because many jurisdictions do not track stops, let alone the near-
seizures described in this Subpart. Even when officers are asked to record stops, underreporting'is
likely. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The frequency
of police-civilian contact also varies sharply by geographic area. One survey estimated that about 26
percent of the U.S. population age sixteen and older had some face-to-face contact with a police
officer in 2011, with the majority of the involuntary encounters being traffic stops. LYNN
LANGTON & MATrHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING
TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 1-2 (rev. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub
/pdf/pbtssll.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK8R-27JD]. In some urban areas, however, there are as
many stops as residents, or more. A detailed dataset concerning stops in New York City revealed a
concentration of stops in particular neighborhoods and toward persons of color. See CTR. FOR
CONSTrIITONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT (2012); see also Barry
Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining Whats "Reasonable"'- The Protections for Policing, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 299-300 (2016) (describing the frequency of stops and bus sweeps in
various jurisdictions). In one Brooklyn neighborhood between 2006 and 2010, data suggests that
young black males were stopped an average of five times each per year. Ray Rivera et al., A Few
Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.htnl [http-//perma.cc/8VY6-TNA7].
64. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Logic ... would
seem to dictate that arrests be subject to the warrant requirement at least to the same extent as
searches. But logic sometimes must defer to history and experience."). Today, though courts
occasionally speak as though warrants are the default requirement, the vast majority of both
searches and seizures are conducted without a warrant. Compare Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
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with a balancing test that weighs the intrusiveness of a particular seizure against
the government's justification for it. Balancing, however, suggests a more complex
or nuanced analysis than that which actually structures seizure doctrine. Across
the full gamut of seizures of persons, from stops to shootings, reasonableness is
typically a matter of two simple criteria: suspicion and nonsubmission. This
Subpart discusses suspicion, and the next addresses nonsubmission.
For the initial decision to seize a person, suspicion of unlawful activity is
usually sufficient (though it is not always necessary)." I use the adjective unlawful
rather than criminal deliberately, because police are permitted to make stops on
suspicion of various civil and traffic violations; hence the familiarity of those blue
lights on American roadways.66 Fourth Amendment doctrine has identified two
major suspicion thresholds: reasonable suspicion and probable cause. The Terry
stop, as discussed above, requires only reasonable suspicion that the individual is
engaged in or planning unlawful activity, or has already committed a felony."
Reasonable suspicion can be satisfied by a few standard formulas, such as "evasive"
2473, 2482 (2014) ("Our cases have determined that '[w]here a search is undertaken by law
enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing,.. . reasonableness generally
requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.' (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 653 (1995))), with Susan R Klein, Identi5ing and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 ICH. L. REV. 1030, 1038
n.28 (2001) (citing evidence that the majority of searches, perhaps as high as ninety-eight percent,
are conducted without a warrant).
65. The Supreme Court has said that suspicion that a person has relevant evidence and may be a
"material witness" can constitute "individualized suspicion" for Fourth Amendment purposes, even
in the absence of any reason to suspect that the individual has himself committed a crime. See
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 738 & n.2 (2011). Some lower courts have used the same
reasoning to justify Terry stops of non-suspects. See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 787 A.2d 1284, 1287-88
(Vt. 2001). In addition, when police have sufficient suspicion to conduct a search of a given
location, they have authority to seize persons on the premises for the duration of the search. See
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
66. See Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped Decriminalization and Legalism's Limits, 24
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 336-39 (2014) (explaining that the authority to arrest is not
limited to criminal offenses).
67. Though Terry is understood to authorize stops based on "reasonable suspicion" based on "specific
and articulable facts," the Terry majority did not use the precise words "reasonable suspicion." See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (referring to "specific and articulable facts"). The meaning
(and mystery) of the phrase was discussed at oral argument. Justice Douglas used it in his Terry
dissent, and the Court now uses the phrase regularly. Id at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The term
'probable cause' rings a bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as 'reasonable
suspicion.'); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 571 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
The Court extended the authority to make Terry stops to investigations of completed felonies in
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), but declined to decide whether a police officer may
make a stop based on reasonable suspicion of a completed misdemeanor. Id at 229.
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or "furtive" movements combined with presence in an area classified by police as
"high crime."68
An actual public arrest-which usually involves not just detention and ques-
tioning on the street, but transport to a police station and a formal booking-
requires probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime.69
Probable cause is always described as a more demanding standard than reasonable
suspicion, but courts have refiused to express either standard as a quantitative
probability. Accordingly, it is not dear exactly what distinguishes the two types
of suspicion.70 One possible distinction is that reasonable suspicion does not appear
to require suspicion of any particular crime-it is enough that the officer believes
some kind of wrongdoing "may be afoot"-while courts often say that probable
cause requires suspicion of a particular offense." In any event, the distinction
between a stop and an arrest, while potentially important to the individual suspect
and his criminal record, is of limited importance to an analysis of police force.
Authority to make either a stop or an arrest carries with it the authority to use
some force if necessary to subdue the suspect.
How much force is an important question, but before we address that issue,
it is worth clarifying the precise way in which suspicion renders a seizure of a person
reasonable. A stop or arrest is reasonable when it is made in the presence of
adequate grounds for suspicion. When such grounds are present, little else
matters. In that sense, suspicion (either reasonable suspicion or probable cause) is
a safe harbor: Once the grounds for suspicion are established, the legal inquiry is
over.72 Criteria of constitutionality are better understood as safe harbors than legal
limitations, as Josh Bowers has explained, when they are "thresholds to permissive
state action."" Bowers identifies probable cause as one such safe harbor, noting
68. See Fagan & Geller, supra note 59.
69. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415 (1976) (holding that the police may make a
warrantless arrest in a public place based only on probable cause); qC Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 576 (1980) (holding that the police need a warrant to make a routine felony arrest in the
suspect's home rather than in public).
70. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (stating that probable cause is not
quantifiable); Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) ("Articulating precisely what
'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is not possible."); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 330 (1990) ("Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause .... ").
71. I am characterizing the way the two standards are treated by lower courts. The Supreme Court has
not ruled directly on the question whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause requires suspicion
ofa specific, identified offense. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1(b), at 8 n.29 (5th ed. 2012); 4 id § 9.5(c).
72. See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a
"Pointless Indignity,"66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1031-34 (2014).
73. Id at 1031. As Susan Klein argues (apparently introducing the term "constitutional safe harbor"),
another feature of a constitutional safe harbor rule is that it almost certainly protects some conduct
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that it "does not so much constrain as it empowers."74 Probable cause is a standard
so frequently and easily satisfied that the police could not possibly make a stop or
arrest every time they have probable cause to do so. Instead, police have discretion
to choose which instances of probable cause they will pursue, and in any given
case, the fact of probable cause legitimates but does not necessarily determine or
motivate the police action. The suspected violation can be a mere pretext for a
stop designed to investigate the possibility of other crimes, crimes about which
the officer has no legally cognizable suspicion at all."s Officers regularly use traffic
stops to look for evidence of drug trafficking, for example. Additionally, a
seizure's reasonableness is not dependent on the need to prosecute the suspected
offense. Nor does reasonableness turn on an accurate understanding of the
underlying substantive criminal law; an officer who mistakenly (but reasonably)
believes that it is illegal to drive with only one brake light may stop a motorist on
that ground."6 In short, the legality of the initial decision to make a seizure turns
on one criterion-objectively reasonable grounds to suspect the person-and is
decidedly not an all-things-considered reasonableness inquiry.
So far, I have presented the doctrinal framework with barely a word about
race. That is the way the Supreme Court usually discusses suspicion and its ability
to legitimate seizures. Suspicion, as doctrinally relevant, means suspicion that a
person has engaged in unlawful activity, even a minor or civil infraction. Racial-
ized suspicion-an officer's selection of a target on the basis of his or her race-is
irrelevant if the officer can point to nonracial reasons to suspect an infrac-,
tion.7 ' Part II will examine the racial implications of seizure doctrine in more de-
tail, but this basic point should be noted for now: Because suspicion operates as
that violates the underlying constitutional norm. See Klein, supra note 64, at 1033 ("A prophylactic
rule potentially overprotects the constitutional clause at issue, while a safe harbor rule potentially
underprotects it. . .. [T]he safe harbor rule will allow some government behavior that would
otherwise be declared unconstitutional without the rule."). For example, the rule that officers may
always search an arrestee's person and the immediately surrounding area, though justified as a
mechanism to protect officer safety, almost certainly permits and even encourages many searches
that the arresting officer knows to be unnecessary for safety. See id at 1045 (discussing Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and its grant of authority to search area surrounding an arrestee as
a safe harbor rule).
74. Bowers, supra note 72, at 1032.
75. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).
76. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
77. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47, 354 (2001) (acknowledging that an arrest
was a "pointless indignity" imposed "by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor
judgment," but concluding nonetheless that the arrest was reasonable because the officer had
probable cause to suspect a seatbelt violation).
78. I am hardly the first to observe this implication of the Fourth Amendment standard of objective
reasonableness. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Ohjective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of
Discriminatory Intent in the CriminalLaw, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559 (1998).
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a safe harbor, and because it is very easy to satisfy the minimal Fourth Amend-
ment suspicion thresholds and reach that safe harbor, racial bias in seizure deci-
sions is nearly impossible to challenge.
C. What Makes a Seizure Reasonable: Nonsubmission
Reasonableness governs not only the fact of a seizure but also the manner in
which the seizure is carried out.79 In this second dimension, nonsubmission is
particularly important. Given the broad authority that the police have to make
seizures, it is inevitable that some of their targets will attempt to flee or resist.
This reaction then authorizes the officer to use as much force as is "objectively
reasonable."" Again, balancing is nominally the methodological approach. Indi-
vidual interests are weighed against governmental ones. In theory, a balancing
model suggests that the use of deadly force or even nondeadly weapons should
require circumstances far more dire than those that justify mere arrest. In practice,
if an officer acting on suspicion meets resistance from his target, the officer's
authority to use force expands rapidly and reaches a license to kill quickly. The
target need not even actually resist. If the officer suspects nonsubmission-if he
or she perceives a threat from the target-the officer becomes empowered to use
force."1 Even this does not quite capture the full scope of the doctrinal authori-
zation, for Fourth Amendment reasonableness is an objective standard rather
than a subjective one. To be precise, if factors exist that would lead a reasonable
officer to suspect nonsubmission-whatever this officer believed-then the officer
is empowered to use force. This is the short blue line that has led to the deaths of
Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Philando Castile, and other unarmed black men.
Long before those names became familiar, another unarmed black man
named Dethorne Graham was beaten by police officers in Charlotte, North
Carolina.82 Graham was not killed by the officers, and his subsequent lawsuit led
to a Supreme Court opinion that addresses the use of force broadly rather than
deadly force in particular. Nevertheless, Graham's experience and the judicial
response can be seen as harbingers of more recent police killings. In Graham v.
79. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
80. Grahamv. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,397 (1989).
81. As discussed below, the doctrine requires that the officer's perception be reasonable, but courts
usually defer to the officer and almost never conclude a perception of danger was unreasonable.
82. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389-90. The Supreme Court described Graham as "a diabetic" but did not
mention his race. See id at 388. Graham's brief to the Court identifies him both as a diabetic and
as "a black male employee of the North Carolina Department of Transportation." Brief for the
Petitioner, Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (No. 87-6571), 1988 WL 1025786, at *3.
1203The Constitution of Police Violence
20 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182 (2017)
Connor,83 more than in any decision focused specifically on deadly force, the
Court constructed a second safe harbor for police, one that protects the use of
violence rather than the mere fact of a stop or arrest. The details are instructive.
This Subpart begins with a dose study of Graham to reveal the role of nonsubmis-
sion in the constitutional authorization of police violence, then examines the Gra-
ham standard in operation and the development of a new safe harbor.
1. The Basic Paradigm
Dethome Graham aroused a police officer's suspicion one day in 1984 by
entering a convenience store and leaving again very quickly.8 4 The officer
followed and stopped Graham, but apparently did not believe Graham's explana-
tion that he was a diabetic in search of orange juice to avoid an oncoming insulin
reaction. Other officers arrived at the scene, and they handcuffed Graham, put
him face down on the hood of a car, shoved his face into the hood, and later
"threw him headfirst into the police car."ss One officer said, probably using fill
epithets rather than the abbreviations that made it into the official record, "Ain't
nothing wrong with the M. F. but drunk. Lock the S. B. up."86 Another told
Graham to shut up when he asked the officers to look in his wallet for proof of his
diabetes. When one of Graham's friends showed up with orange juice for him,
the police refused to let him have it. Eventually, the officers learned that Graham
had not committed any crime at the convenience store, and they released him.
Graham suffered several injuries from the police, including bruises, cuts, a broken
foot, and an injured shoulder."
Graham sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers
involved had used excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights." The
initial trial ended with a directed verdict for the police officers, after the trial court
applied a substantive due process analysis that asked, among other things, if the
officers had acted maliciously with the specific intent to harm.89 Graham and
83. Graham, 490 U.S. 386.
84. Id. at 389.
85. Id.
86. Id
87. Id at 390.
88. Id; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
89. Graham, 490 U.S. at 390-91. The four factors considered by the trial court were those articulated
in johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), to evaluate uses of force in jails; they were
later applied in the prison context as well. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
The factors included "the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
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amici perceived this intent inquiry as a bar to recovery for most victims of police
violence.
On appeal, Graham argued that his claim should be adjudicated instead
under the Fourth Amendment's standard of objective reasonableness without
regard to the officers' subjective intentions, and the Supreme Court agreed."
The Court acknowledged that "[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application."' In
the absence of a precise test, the Court identified relevant factors to the reasona-
bleness inquiry, "including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."92 Instead of asking
what the actual officer was thinking, the question was whether a hypothetical
reasonable officer could have concluded that the circumstances justified the use of
force.93 And reviewing courts must not rely on "the 20/20 vision of hindsight,"
but rather must make "allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation."9
A few points about Graham bear emphasis. First, suspicion: The police
became interested when Graham, a black man, entered a convenience store and
left it again quickly. No other rationale for the stop-the initial seizure-was
offered, and none was necessary. Second, nonsubmission: Though the Supreme
Court didn't mention it (they were ruling for Graham, or at least, in favor of his
proposed shift from due process to the Fourth Amendment), the lower court had
described Graham as physically resisting the officers.95 The Supreme Court did
of causing harm." Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033. Under this standard, the district and appellate courts
both concluded that Graham had failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Graham,
490 U.S. at 390-92.
90. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 82, at 23.
91. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,559 (1979)).
92. Id
93. See id at 397.
94. Id. at 396-97.
95. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986) ("The officers then
attempted to place the Plaintiff in Officer Connor's patrol car and the Plaintiff vigorously resisted
this effort, by kicking and otherwise attempting to keep from being placed in the car."), affd, 827
F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Graham v. Connor, 488 U.S. 816 (1988), vacated,
490 U.S. 386 (1989). The lower court opinions also mention another factor that, in this particular
case, seems to have contributed to the police officers' decision to use force: "Meanwhile, a crowd
had gathered around and Officer Townes testified that it appeared things were getting out of
hand." Id The gathering crowd calls to mind George Orwell's "Shooting an Elephant," as
powerful an essay on police force as it is on colonialism:
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not address that factual claim directly, but it identified attempts to resist or evade
arrest as factors relevant to the objective reasonableness analysis. And this leads
to the third key dimension of Graham: the shift from a subjective inquiry into the
officer's state of mind to an objective analysis. As is true with the suspicion
thresholds discussed in the previous Subpart, the doctrinal emphasis on objective
reasonableness--on whether a hypothetical reasonable officer could have found
adequate suspicion or could have believed the suspect likely to resist-produces a
safe harbor in which police action actually motivated by bias, caprice, or some
other non-constitutional criteria is constitutionally permissible."6
In 1989, the year the Supreme Court issued its opinion, it seemed to most
commentators that Graham had won an important victory, it was assumed that
Fourth Amendment reasonableness would prohibit more police violence than
the substantive due process inquiry into officers' motivations.97 In giving up the
subjective motivation inquiry, however, the Court also abandoned other features
of the substantive due process analysis: an inquiry into whether the force was
necessary, and a direct proportionality inquiry that examined the relationship
between the need for force and the degree of force used. To be sure, in 1989,.
scholars and practitioners might have thought that necessity was as much a com-
ponent of Fourth Amendment analysis as it was of the due process standard; in
1985, the Court had seemed to say as much, at least in the context of deadly force,
in Tennessee v. Garner." But the Graham Court did not address the necessity of
force except in passing, to defer to officers' judgments: "The calculus of reasona-
bleness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
I glanced round at the crowd that had followed me.... I had got to shoot the
elephant. I had committed myself to doing it when I sent for the rifle. A sahib
has got to act like a sahib; he has got to appear resolute, to know his own mind
and do definite things. To come all that way, rifle in hand, with two thousand
people marching at my heels, and then to trail feebly away, having done noth-
ing-no, that was impossible.
GEORGE ORWELL, Shooting an Elephant, in THE ORWELL READER. FICTION, ESSAYS, AND
REPORTAGE 3, 6-7 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1956).
96. "An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively
reasonable use of force; nor will an officers good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of
force constitutional." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
97. See, e.g., Glen Elsasser, Police-Brtality Definition Is Wdenedby High Court, CHI. TRIB., May 16,
1989.
98. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). "[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause
to believe that he has conmmitted a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given." Id at 11-12 (emphasis added).
1206
situation." And later, the Supreme Court would make clear that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness does not require a showing that the force used was
actually or even apparently necessary.' 00
In operation, the objective reasonableness standard did not seem to help
Dethorne Graham as an individual, and it has not served as the constraint on
police violence that commentators envisioned in 1989. Graham's lawsuit was
remanded for consideration under the Fourth Amendment standard, and though
there is no opinion entered after the remand, Graham apparently lost at retrial,
too.101 Perhaps this result was thanks to the officers' allegation that Graham had
physically resisted them. But whatever the particular aspects of "the factbound
morass of reasonableness"' that justified the beating of Graham, later decisions
suggest that for police officers, the adjudication of the use of force under the
Fourth Amendment has revealed not so much a morass as another safe harbor.
Dethorne Graham's case is illustrative, but it may mislead in one respect: It
may suggest that the nonsubmission that empowers officers to use force is the
"vigorous resistance" to arrest attributed to Graham by the lower federal courts.' 0 '
We know relatively little about whether Graham actually resisted the officers or
how he did so. But it probably does not matter, because nonsubmission is a
concept much broader than a physical struggle to avoid arrest. As explained further
below, nonsubmission includes an attempt to run away, a passive refisal to do as
the officer orders, or even the mere appearance of dangerousness-a failure to
dispel the perception of possible attack, one might say. These various forms of
nonsubmission do not authorize deadly force in every instance, but they all
authorize some degree of force. That view is stated explicitly in federal court
opinions, which routinely authorize low-level uses of force based on an officer's
perception of danger,'" and it is reflected clearly in police departments' use-of-
force policies, discussed in Part I.D.
99. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
100. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382-83, 382 n.9 (2007) (rejecting an interpretation of Garner as
creating "rigid preconditions," including necessity, for the use of deadly force).
101. Eileen Sullivan, Supreme Court Case to Shape Ferguson Investigation, SALON (Aug. 22, 2014, 1:30
AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/08/22/supreme court case_to shapefergusonjinvestigation2
[httpI//perma.cc/QFK9-GWYUj] (reporting that Graham lost his second trial).
102. After rejecting necessity and other "rigid preconditions" for the use of deadly force, the Scott Court
declared, "[I]n the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of
'reasonableness.'" Scott, 550 U.S. at 382-83.
103. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (stating that Graham
"vigorously resisted" the police), affd, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. 488 U.S.
816 (1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
104. For example, lower federal courts have widely endorsed the routine practices of drawing weapons
and handcuffing suspects during Terry stops, on the grounds that such stops are dangerous. See
Mark A. Godsey, Wben Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM
1207The Constitution of Police Violence
1208 64 UCLA L. REv. 1182 (2017)
2. Nonsubmission as a Safe Harbor
Nonsubmission-broadly understood to include noncooperation, flight,
and threats of harm as well as active resistance-has become the most important
consideration in use of force analysis. Importantly, it is the objectively reasonable
perception of nonsubmission that matters, thus creating another doctrinal safe
harbor. As noted in Subpart I.B, reasonable suspicion and probable cause function
as safe harbors for Fourth Amendment seizures, so that objectively reasonable
indicia of these suspicion thresholds immunize decisions to seize from further
scrutiny. Similarly, Fourth Amendment doctrine identifies relatively clearly for
police a simple factor, nonsubmission, that will shield the use of force from a
finding of unconstitutionality, whatever other particular facts may exist in a given
case. As the Graham Court emphasized, "[a]n officer's evil intentions will not
make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of
force."'os
Given courts' frequent characterization of the use of force standard as a fact-
specific, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, it is crucial to emphasize the
controlling effect of nonsubmission.106  Resistance or flight apparently makes
unnecessary an independent inquiry into whether the suspect posed an immediate
danger to officers or others.10' Resistance to arrest is nearly a per se showing
of danger to the officer, and flight from a stop or arrest, at least by car, is nearly a
L. REv. 715, 728-33 (1994) (discussing cases that expand the use of force permitted during a
Terry stop).
105. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The Court's next claim-"nor will an officer's good
intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional"-is questionable at best, as
discussed below. Id An officer's intentions may not matter as a formal doctrinal matter, but an
offices's perceptions are the core of the analysis.
106. See, e.g., Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d
805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010); Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th
Cir. 2008).
107. Numerous federal opinions reject excessive force claims on the grounds that the suspect fled or
resisted officers in some significant way, even when other factors suggest that the force was not
necessary or all-things-considered reasonable. See, e.g., Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275 (11th
Cir. 2002) (granting qualified immunity to officers who shot and killed a suspect immediately after
a car chase, even though the suspect had stopped the car and allegedly had his hands in the air at
time of shooting). Conversely, the rare excessive force claims that succeed tend to be those in
which a claim of the suspect's flight or resistance is implausible, such as an officer's beating of a
handcuffed or incapacitated suspect. See, e.g., Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 301-02 (6th Cir. 2002)
(affirming denial of summary judgment to officers who hit a handcuffed suspect); see also Priester v.
City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 923-24 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court's denial
ofjudgment as a matter of law to police officers when evidence suggested that the officers ordered a
canine to attack a prone, submissivesuspect who had complied with the officers'instructions).
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per se showing of danger to the public.os The Graham Court's other enumerated
factor-the severity of the suspected crime-is now mostly ignored, as illustrated
by the decision not to indict the officer who killed Eric Garner while trying to arrest
him for selling loose cigarettes. 109
Two further points about nonsubmission bear repeating. First, constitu-
tional doctrine does not require proportionality. The officer's force may far exceed
the suspect's resistance; indeed, that is the point-to overcome resistance. If the
suspect attempts to flee, the officer may use deadly force so long as the suspect
may be said to pose a danger to the public.1 o To many officers, flight itself is suf-
ficient to demonstrate that danger to the public, and juries have often accepted this
argument."' Resistance without flight, if sufficient to put the officer in physical
108. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 385-86 (2007). The Scott majority denied Justice Stevens's
contention that they had adopted a per se rule that any suspect fleeing the police posed a continuing
danger to the public. The majority insisted, however, that such dangers might continue when a
suspect flees, and in a car chase scenario with other drivers on the roadways, that possibility is
apparently enough to justify a use of (deadly) force against the fleeing suspect. Id. at 385 n.11. In
other words, it is difficult to imagine a flight from police by automobile that wouldn't qualify as
dangerous, given the Court's analysis.
109. See J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand jury Doesn't Indict Oficer in Eric
Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,2014), http-//www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion
/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-gamer.html?_r-0
[http://perma.cc/8EAD-24ZU]; see also Ames v. King County, 846 F.3d 340, 348-49 (9th Cir.
2017) ('The first Graham factor speaks of the 'severity of the crime at issue,' but we think the district
court applied this factor too narrowly when it focused on [the suspect's] misdemeanor obstruction [of
the police officer] rather than the nature of the ongoing emergency exacerbated by [the suspect's]
resistance.").
110. "It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape," the Supreme Court held in
Tennessee v. Garner, thus suggesting that flight alone cannot authorize deadly force. 471 U.S. 1, 11
(1985). But the Court quickly added that flight under conditions suggesting dangerousness would
warrant deadly force: "Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force." Id Note that the Garner Court framed the
rule as a safe harbor- It identified a single factor-suspicion of dangerousness-that renders the use
of force "not constitutionally unreasonable." Id There are probably relatively few fleeing suspects
who are not plausibly characterized as dangerous, but Walter Scott may be one example. Stopped
by a South Carolina police officer on the grounds that one of his taillights was not working, Scott
attempted to flee the traffic stop on foot and was shot and killed by the officer. Frances Robles &
Shaila Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to jail. Lose Job. Repeat., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-child-support-go-to-jail-lose-job-repeat.html
[http://perma.cc/4PLP-C8TF]. Scott did not have a history of violent crime, but owed several
thousand dollars in child support payments. Id. The officer was later charged with murder, but the
case ended in a mistrial. Mark Berman, MistrialDeclared in Case of South Carolina Officer Who Shot
Walter Scott After Traffic Step, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-nation/wp/2016/12/05/mistrial-declared-in-case-of-south-carolina-officer-who-shot-
walter-scott-after-taffic-stop/utmjterm=.474fde8le4ba [http://perma.cc/DJ47-GSXH].
111. This view is illustrated by Lisa Mearkle, a Pennsylvania police officer who killed David Kassick in
2015 after Kassick fled from a traffic stop. "She could not let Kassick escape, she said, because
someone who runs from an officer might be a danger to the community. 'Something is wrong
danger, also authorizes deadly force. Once deadly force is authorized, officers are
permitted and expected to "empty their guns"-to use as much force as they can
muster until the suspect is thoroughly, unquestionably incapacitated.112
And second, the mere perception of nonsubmission will authorize an officer
to use force, or more precisely, facts that would lead a hypothetical reasonable
officer to perceive likely nonsubmission will generate the authority to use force.
Actual nonsubmission is not required. In some tragic cases, the very effort to
comply with a police command might provide the indicia of noncompliance that
renders a use of force objectively reasonable: A suspect wearing headphones tries
to turn off his music to better hear an officer, and the officer believes the suspect
to be reaching for a weapon." 3 Or, as was reported with respect to the shooting
of Philando Castile, the suspect reaches for his identification after the officer has
asked for it, and the officer fears the suspect is reaching for a gun.114 Thus, the
language of objective reasonableness, exemplified by passages such as the Graham
Court's claim that an officer's good intentions cannot alone render the use of
force legal, is misleading."s It suggests that the legal standard is not one made by
the officer himself. But (professed) intentions and (professed) perceptions are
closely linked, and courts defer almost invariably to police officers' later accounts
of their perceptions of danger or resistance."' In other words, if an officer perceives
a threat, or later claims to have perceived such a threat, his use of force will almost
certainly be found authorized.
here,' she testified, recalling her thinking at the start of the chase. This is not normal for someone
to flee the police.'" Kindy et al., supra note 1. Mearkle was charged with third-degree murder and
manslaughter but was acquitted by a jury. Id
112. See Plumhoffv. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014) ("[I]f police officers are justified in firing at
a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the
threat has ended.").
113. Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125,128 (4th Cir. 2001).
114. Pam Louwagie, Falcon Heights Police Shooting Reverberates Across the Nation, STARTRIBUNE (July
8, 2016, 3:15 PM), http://www.startribune.com/aftermath-of-fatal-officer-involved-shooting-in-
falcon-heights-is-captured-on-video/385861101 [http://perma.cc/VC9E-2BVF].
115. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,397 (1989).
116. Courts defer to officers, and prosecutors do, too. The usual federal standard for prosecuting
excessive force as a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 242 is even more stringent than the
criteria for finding a simple Fourth Amendment violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). But the
two laws of policing interact, and the protection of mistaken officers from prosecution
contributes to the acceptance of their conduct as reasonable. The Department of Justice has
apparently accepted the holdings of several federal courts that even wildly mistaken perceptions
of nonsubmission are sufficient to immunize officers from federal civil rights charges. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 79 ("Mistake, panic, misperception, or even poor
judgment by a police officer does not provide a basis for prosecution under Section 242."); see
also Joseph Goldstein, Is a Police Shooting a Crime? It Depends on the Officer's Point ofView, N.Y.
TIMES (July 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/nyregion/is-a-police-shooting-a
-crime-it-depends-on-the-officers-point-of-view.html.
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Perception should be distinguished from deception. The doctrine evaluates
force by considering the hypothetical perceptions of a reasonable officer. One
would not expect the law to countenance deception-outright lies about what the
officer saw or feared. Some recent shootings have proven especially controversial
because video evidence contradicts the officer's account of the incident, or at the
very least, provides members of the public a chance to form their own perceptions
about whether the shooting victim was resisting or threatening violence."' Officers
caught in deception are probably more likely to be prosecuted successfully, but
that is due to extraconstitutional mores, not to constitutional doctrine."' Again,
evil intentions-or duplicity-will not render unconstitutional an objectively
reasonable use of force. As video becomes ubiquitous and more police violence is
captured on video, perhaps the specific phenomenon of police deception (about
uses of force) will decrease. But there is no reason to think that good faith
violence-which includes mistakenly but genuinely panicked violence-will
decrease. And if the video reveals any evidence of nonsubmission, even deceptive
officers will continue to enjoy the safe harbor of objective reasonableness.
This Subpart has argued that, in the same way that a trivial, easily satisfied
suspicion requirement creates a safe harbor in which stops are legal, an often trivial
and easily satisfied nonsubmission inquiry creates a safe harbor for police vio-
lence. Of course, many instances of noncooperation do not lead to a beating, a
Taser, or a gunshot, just as many instances of police-observed probable cause do
not lead to an arrest. Many failures to cooperate are met with no violence at all,
and many others are met with rough treatment that inflicts no permanent injury
and does not register in official records.119 Flight and resistance are not guarantees
117. After shooting an unarmed black motorist named Samuel Dubose, Cincinnati police officer Ray
Tensing reported that Dubose had threatened him and dragged him with his car. These claims
were contradicted by the video recorded by Tensing's body camera, and Tensing was indicted for
murder. Richard Prez-Peia, University of Cincinnati Officer Indicted in Shooting Death of Samuel
Dubose, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http//ww.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/us/university-of-
cincinnati-officer-indicted-in-shooting-death-of-motorist.html [http://perma.cc/2EFH-FN98].
118. For example, Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke was charged with murder after he killed
Laquan McDonald, a black teenager. But the murder charges came over a year after the killing,
almost simultaneously with the release to the public of a video that proved false many of initial
reports about the incident from Van Dyke and his colleagues, including his claims that the teenager
had approached him while swinging a knife in an "aggressive, exaggerated manner." See Wayne
Drash, The Killing ofLaquan McDonald: The Dashcam Video vs. Police Accounts, CNN (Dec.
19, 2015, 12:32 AM), http-//www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/us/laquan-mcdonald-video-records-
comparison [http://perma.cc/VKP7-ADGG].
119. Killings of suspects by police officers are becoming more closely documented and subject to at least
some empirical analysis. But most instances of police force are much less dramatic, and there is
little comprehensive data available on what Stuntz called "low-level" police violence. William J.
Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law ofCriminalProcedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1066 (1995)
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that police will use violence; they are simply the boundaries of a safe harbor in
which police are empowered to make that choice. How police make the choice-
the specific ways in which they exercise their considerable discretion to use
violence-is one of the most contentious policing issues today, and we turn to
that issue in Part II.
D. Force as a Concept, and a Continuum
Constitutional doctrine draws a blueprint for police violence. It invites
officers to interrupt civilians, sometimes with minimal suspicion or no suspicion
at all. Once interrupted, the citizen must comply with the officer's requests or
risk expanding the officer's authority.120 Actual or perceived noncompliance
rapidly ratchets up the officer's authorization to use force, and any noncom-
pliance perceived to be dangerous empowers the officer to kill. In this way
Fourth Amendment doctrine constitutes police violence, but the law is constitutive
in another sense as well. The concepts of resistance and nonsubmission are so
central to the legitimating structure of the law of police violence that they have
come to define force itself. Increasingly, what counts as force is always already
reactive, a response to resistance-and if it becomes necessary to project or imagine
the resistance in order to explain the force, officers, courts, and many observers
have demonstrated the ease with which that projection takes place.
From the perspective of police officers, a suspect's resistance is bound up
with the very concept of force. This is the way officers are trained: Most law
enforcement agencies instruct officers to follow a use of force continuum, a chart
that describes degrees of resistance to police commands and the permissible
responses. In a typical framework, verbal noncompliance from the suspect may
be met with verbal commands.121 But "passive resistance" (failure to comply with
commands) may be met with "hands-on tactics" or pepper spray, active resistance
(efforts to escape or avoid arrest that are unlikely to inflict injury) may be met
with batons, Tasers, and other non-deadly force; and, in accordance with the
doctrinal standards discussed above, any threat of death or serious bodily injury to
(describing "a kind of police behavior that happens all the time ... and yet receives astonishingly
little legal regulation: low-level violence against suspects").
120. Compulsory compliance, the flipside of disallowing nonsubmission, is worthy of independent
consideration. I address Fourth Amendment compliance requirements at greater length in Part II.
121. These examples are based on the Orlando, Florida Police Department's "Resistance and Response
Continuum" report, discussed and reproduced in part in Michael E. Miller, Taser Use and the Use-
of-Force Continuum:Examining theEffectofPolcy Change, POLICE CHIEF, Sept. 2010, at 72.
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the officer or anyone else may be countered with deadly force.1 22 The standard
use of force continuum reflects and communicates the principle that disobedience
is not to be tolerated, and force is the logical result of any resistance. It also sets
the expectation of escalation: After the first resistance, force will escalate until the
suspect is subdued or dead. And it is easier to step on that escalator than the official
continuum suggests. In official policy, mere lack of respect for authority is not
identified as a form of resistance that warrants a use of force. But in practice,
many officers view a lack of respect in just that way,' 23 so much so that it is
standard to speak of arrests for the uncodified but very real offense called "contempt
of cop."1 24
Part I.C.2 addressed the various types of behavior that count as nonsubmis-
sion or resistance, but it is also worth considering what counts as force or violence.
So far I have referred to police force without offering a definition, but the term
does not go uncontested. "Use of force" typically includes physical contact, es-
pecially strikes or any contact likely to cause pain, and the use ofweapons. But in
the absence of the infliction of pain or injury, and in the absence of resistance,
many agencies and police officials avoid the label of force. For example, one
scholar identifies a "reasonable definition" offorce in a federal consent order:
[A]ny physical strike or instrumental contact with a person; any
intentional attempted physical strike or instrumental contact that does
not take effect, or any significant physical contact that restricts the
movement of a person. The term includes the discharge of firearms;
the use of chemical spray, choke holds or hard hands; the taking of a
subject to the ground; or the deployment of a canine. The term does
not include escorting or handcuffing a person, with no or minimal re-
sistance.125
Under this definition, an ordinary custodial arrest involves no use of force,
even if the suspect is handcuffed and placed in the back of a police cruiser. He has
been subject to physical contact that restricts his movement, but unless he resists,
122. Id; see alsoJennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 12 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing police training and the use-
of-force continuum).
123. SeeJEROME H. SKOLNICK &JAMESJ. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
USE OF FORCE 102-03 (1993).
124. "Every trial judge in this state has seen cases where an officer has exercised the discretion to arrest
for 'contempt of cop.' State v. Suiter, No. 25783, 2001 WL 1002069, at *6 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept.
4, 2001) (Horton, J., concurring) (upholding, reluctantly, a conviction for disturbing the peace,
after the defendant told a police officer to "fuck off'), vacated, 56 P.3d 775 (Idaho 2002) (reversing
on First Amendment grounds).
125. Harmon, supra note 16, at 1125 n.14 (quoting Consent Judgment: Conditions of Confinement at
1-2, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-72258 (E.D. Mich., July 18, 2003)).
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no force has been used. Even minimal resistance is not enough; the arrestee must
really fight back before the arrest is classified as forceful.12 6
Some police departments have sought to jettison the phrase "use of force"
altogether; a favored replacement is "response to resistance. "127 The violence or
force of the police officer is not to be named as such, and at the same time, the
purported justification for the violence is built into the rhetoric. It is a linguistic
move reminiscent of the 1940s rebranding of the U.S. Department of War as the
Department of Defense. Even among departments that retain the phrase "use of
force," though, resistance is at the core of the concept.
Thus, on the mainstream account resistance both defines and legitimizes
force. The ordinary incidents of ordinary seizures-termination of freedom
of movement, perhaps handcuffs-do not count as force in the absence of
resistance. This exclusion is not consistent with the subjective experiences of
suspects, who often perceive arrests as force, or with the ordinary use of language,
in which a private individual who handcuffed and restrained another person
would likely be seen as a violent criminal."' Nor is a resistance requirement as a
component of police force entirely consistent with every aspect of constitutional
doctrine. The Supreme Court has, at least in passing, characterized handcuffs
as a use of force, even in the absence of resistance. 129 But the usual doctrinal
reference to force does assume a response to resistance, and scholars also typically
126. There are echoes here of the erstwhile resistance requirement in rape law. To prove that sex had
taken place "by force," many jurisdictions once required proof that the victim had resisted. One
infamous opinion called resistance the "sine qua non [of| the crime of rape," and went on to explain
that minimal resistance would not suffice for a conviction. Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538
(Wis. 1906). The court held that the woman must give "her utmost" resistance; "there must be the
most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty within the woman's power to resist the
penetration of her person . . . ." Id Modem sexual assault laws have mostly jettisoned physical
resistance requirements, recognizing that submission is a possible and even likely response to the
use or threat of force. Quiet submission to an arresting officer may similarly indicate the presence,
rather than the absence, of force. Cf Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601,
1607-08 (1986) ("[I]n the United States ... most prisoners walk into prison because they know
they will be dragged or beaten into prison if they do not walk. They do not organize force against
being dragged because they know that if they wage this kind of battle they will lose-very possibly
lose their lives.").
127. Karen M. Blum & John J. Ryan, Recent Developments in the Use of Excessive Force by Law
Enforcement, 24 TOURO L. REV. 569, 581 (2008).
128. Cf Carbado, supra note 53, at 970 (advocating a shift to the "victim perspective" in Fourth
Amendment doctrine, in which "victim" refers to the target of discriminatory police action); Kit
Kinports, CriminalProcedure in Perspective, 98J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 71, 79-91, 94 (2007)
(describing a shift between objective and subjective perspectives in Fourth Amendment law and
suggesting that the suspect's subjective perspective may deserve more weight in the legal definition
of a seizure).
129. SeeMuchler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99 (2005) (referring to the use of handcuffs as a "use of force").
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assume that resistance (or threat) is constitutive of force.130 Resistance defines
force, but of course it also legitimizes force, in the use of force continuum and in
constitutional doctrine. It is not surprising, then, that illegitimate force-
excessive force-almost disappears as a category. It is almost conceptually impos-
sible.13' Without resistance, what the police do is not force, and with resistance,
their uses of force are legitimate.
The doctrinal exposition in this Part has been detailed, but the path to fatal
violence that it reveals is relatively short and simple. Three simple princi-
ples legitimize the use of force, and even the use of deadly force, in mundane
police encounters. First is the narrow definition of seizure, which leaves many po-
lice intrusions outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment altogether. If
courts are able to view the encounter as one that a hypothetical reasonable person
would feel free to terminate, police may interrupt, detain, and question at whim.
Second, low and very easily satisfied suspicion thresholds allow police to detain
individuals in the non-optional encounters formally labeled seizures. Finally, any
form of nonsubmission, from passive non-cooperation to flight to physical
resistance, can give an officer authority to use force, and any perceived threat of
serious physical injury generates a license to use deadly force.
II. THE DISTRBUTIoN OF (POLICE) VIOLENCE
Given how easily officers gain the legal authority to kill, the most surprising
feature of police killings may be that there are not more of them. That is not to
say that police violence is rare-as other scholars have emphasized, "low level,"
non-fatal police violence is common, relatively unnoticed by the media, and
relatively unchecked by the law.'32 The force continuum-and indeed, the near-
seizure/seizure continuum-in the previous Part should make clear that it is a
mistake to study deadly force in isolation. In any case, what drives the current
debate over police violence is less the sheer volume of that violence and instead
the distribution of it. Though data is again hard to obtain and the numbers are
contested, it appears that police officers use force against black men at higher
rates than they use force against other demographic groups.133 The distribution
130. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 16, at 1121 ("[P]olice uses of force are both determined and imposed
by persons who are under threat. . . .").
131. It is only almost impossible, because police occasionally take actions dearly classified as force-a
physical beating, or use of a firearm-under circumstances in which flight or resistance is
impossible, or when flight is implausibly characterized as dangerous. These are the rare instances in
which police force is characterized as excessive. See supra note 107.
132. See supra note 102 and accompanying text-, Stuntz, supra note 119.
133. See Swaine, supra note 1.
1215The Constitution of Police Violence
64 UCLA L. REv. 1182 (2017)
of police violence by race is addressed in Subpart II.A below, but that is not, I
suggest, the sole important distributional question.
A much broader distributional issue is also critical, and remains mostly
neglected in contemporary scholarly and public conversations about policing.
This broader question concerns the distribution of various types of violence-
official and authorized violence, official but illegal violence, private and author-
ized self-defense, private criminal acts-among all persons, police and civilian
alike. The model, or myth, of the modern state is an entity with a monopoly on
legitimate violence: The state claims authority to use violence for the purpose of
controlling and reducing private violence. When Black Lives Matter protestors
are chastised for failing to appreciate that police keep them safe, that distributional
claim is front and center.
This Part explores the distribution of police violence as a subsidiary inquiry
to the distribution of all violence. Of particular interest are the normative views
that underlie the law's distributional choices. As useful and appealing as quanti-
tative data is, it cannot fully guide the discussion here. That is partly because we
lack good data on police violence, and partly because we do not yet know what
data to collect.'34 We cannot measure excessive force without a dear conception
ofwhat counts as force, or as excessive. The previous Part revealed ways in which
resistance informs the very concept of force, and renders it legitimate rather than
excessive.' In this Part, I consider two other normative judgments that structure
our constitutional framework First, I show that the Supreme Court has long
been aware of the burdens that Fourth Amendment doctrine imposes on persons
of color. Instead of alleviating those burdens, the Court has directly increased
them, effectively placing on minorities a duty of compliance with the police.
134. See supra note 1; see also Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L.
REV. 1119 passim (2013); Fryer, supra note 14, at 2 ("[T]he current debate is virtually data free.").
135. A recent study highly profiled in the media illustrates that quantitative research may itself be
structured by, rather than independent of, the law's conceptual and normative judgments. Harvard
economist Roland Fryer Jr., himself African-American and reportedly motivated by anger at
Michael Brown's killing, conducted the study to understand racial differences in police violence.
See Quoctrung Bui & Amanda Cox, Surprising New Evidence Shows Bias in Police Use ofForce but
Not in Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/upshot
/surprising-new-evidence-shows-bias-in-police-use-of-force-but-not-in-shootings.html (quoting
Fryer as saying, "You know, protesting is not my thing. But data is my thing."). To measure racial
bias in the use of deadly force, Fryer constructed a dataset of police-civilian interactions "in which
lethal force is more likely to be justified." Fryer, supra note 14, at 3. More specifically, Fryer
focused on arrests for assaulting or attempting to kill an officer, and arrests for resisting, evading, or
interfering in arrest. Id. In other words, Fryer excluded from the outset ordinary police-civilian
encounters, the near-seizures and Terry stops that have led to many recent killings of unarmed
black men. Fryer, like the officers he studied, seems to have viewed police force as necessarily
responsive to a suspect's resistance.
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Second, this racialized burden of compulsory compliance directly contradicts
other aspects of the American political narrative-especially, a right to resist
oppressive government, once protected by a common law right to resist unlawful
arrest and now celebrated in Second Amendment doctrine. The choice not to
extend the privilege of resistance in some contexts must be evaluated against the
backdrop of this political narrative.
A. Race as a Burden
The doctrinal rules described in Part I are nominally race-neutral. Recall
three key principles: First, police are empowered to interrupt and detain individuals
for any reason at all, without constitutional restraint, so long as the encounter is
one that a hypothetical reasonable person would feel free to terminate. Second,
police are empowered to detain individuals in nonoptional encounters-
seizures-so long as there exist minimal indicia of suspicion. And third, police
are empowered to use force so long as there exist indicia of nonsubmission. In
theory, these rules apply uniformly to police-civilian encounters regardless of the
race of the officer or the suspect.
In practice, of course, every police encounter occurs in a world in which
racial identity matters, especially to the determination of whether someone is
suspicious enough to warrant further investigation." 6 In the supposedly consensual
encounters on buses or in airport concourses, racial identity shapes both police
actions and suspects' reactions. So too with flight as a near-seizure-racial
minorities have both more reason to flee police and more to risk by flight. Once
we cross the Court's threshold into what is officially labeled a seizure, empirical
scholars have found race to affect both the initial decision to seize a person and
what happens during the seizure.137 The Court has only rarely mentioned race as
136. The literature on this issue is broad and deep. See, eg., COLE, supra note 52; BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE (2007); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship,
and the Equality PWnciple, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011); Carbado, supra note 53; Samuel
R Gross &Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling andDrug Interdiction on the Highway,
101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002); David A. Harris, The Reality ofRacialDispariy in CriminalJustice:
The Significance ofData Collection, 66 L. &CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (2003); Kevin R. Johnson, How
RacialProfiling Became the Law ofthe Land United States v. Brignoni-Ponce andWhren v. United
States and the Needfor Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. LJ. 1005 (2010); Tracey Maclin, Race
and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998). For a recent study that identifies
various racialized aspects of criminal justice that interact to produce police violence against African
Americans, see Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the
Causes, 104 GEO. LJ. 1479 (2016).
137. See, e.g., GOFF ET AL., supra note 14; Gross & Barnes, supra note 136, at 660 (stating that black
and Latino drivers are more likely to be stopped for traffic offenses); Harris, supra note 136, at 92
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it has promulgated the suspicion and nonsubmission formula, but evaluations of
both suspicion and nonsubmission by police, courts, and the wider public are
deeply affected by race. This Subpart examines the racially disparate effects of the
condemnation of resistance and demand for compliance in Fourth Amendment
doctrine.
1. Judicial Cognizance of Racial Burdens
Here, I want to review the rare mentions of race in seizure doctrine to make
a simple point: This doctrine has been crafted with awareness of its burdens on
persons of color. The issue is foresight, not intent-I do not argue that the
constitutional rules were adopted with the specific aim to generate or legitimize
racial bias in policing.138 But the distributional impact of constitutional criminal
procedure has been emphasized to, and occasionally acknowledged by, federal
courts for decades.'"' More broadly, since their initial development, American
police forces have often served to enforce racial hierarchies, from slavery to Jim
Crow laws to the present.140 The constitutional doctrine that purportedly regulates
these police forces may not reflect racial animus, but it does reflect a normative
judgment about the distribution of violence: The perceived gains in public safety
(presenting evidence that blacks and Latinos are much more likely to be searched after a traffic
stop); Daria Roithmayr, The Dynamics of Excessive Force, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 407, 410
("Research shows that officers are more likely to perceive that black civilians are defiant or resistant,
and are therefore more likely to use excessive force against black civilians.. ."); Fryer, supra note
14, at 3-5.
138. There is a debate among moral theorists as to whether the foresight/intent distinction matters to an
action's moral permissibility. There are reasons to doubt the significance of the distinction in the
context of state action, but I do not engage that debate here. See generally Alice Ristroph, State
Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1391-94 (2008)
(discussing philosophical literature on foresight/intention).
139. By many scholars' accounts, race is at the center of constitutional criminal procedure, in that the
entire field developed as an effort to mitigate racial injustices in the criminal justice system. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48
(2000). Without disputing those accounts, I wish to emphasize judicial awareness that certain
ostensibly race-neutral rules would have disproportionate effects on minority communities. As
Dean Kevin Johnson has recently put it, "[he use of racial profiling by law enforcement
authorities in the United States has long been permitted and encouraged, if not expressly
authorized, by U.S. constitutional law." Johnson, supra note 136, at 1006.
140. See David S. Cohen, Note, Oficial Oppression: A HistoricalAnaysis ofLow-Level Police Abuse and a
Modern Attempt at Reform, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 165, 172-183 (1996); see also
HUBERT WILLIAMS & PATRICK V. MURPHY, PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING NO. 13, THE
EVOLVING STRATEGY OF POLICE: A MINORITY VIEw 1 (1990) https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles/nij/121019.pdf[https://perma.cc/W893-SB3S].
and "effective law enforcement" of expansive police authority are worth the costs
that this authority imposes on persons of color.141
The most striking example may also be the earliest. When the Supreme
Court endorsed investigative stops in Terry v. Ohio,142 it did so with an acknowl-
edgment of the "wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police com-
munity, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain."143
In a footnote, the Court quoted at length from the 1967 report of a presidential
commission on law enforcement that identified the misuse of field interrogations
as a source of friction between police and racial minorities.1" The Court also
noted that stop-and-frisks were sometimes used as an assertion of power and a
tool of humiliation rather than as a genuine investigative effort.145 But the Terry
Court positioned itself as a rueful observer of these abuses, powerless to stop
them. The Court implied that Fourth Amendment law could shape police
behavior only through the exclusionary rule, and claimed that racial harassment
would not be affected by the exclusion of evidence."*
There is reason to doubt that the exclusionary rule is the only means by
which judges affect police behavior-or even that the rule does shape such behav-
ior. 147 And indeed, in the very next section of the opinion, ChiefJustice Warren
abandoned discussion of the exclusionary remedy and emphasized the substan-
tive and expressive importance of Fourth Amendment rules, rejecting the claim
that stops and frisks were not seizures or searches at all.148 The rule the Court
adopted-classifying stops as seizures, but permitting them once the low threshold
of reasonable suspicion was crossed-would allow the continued harassment of
racial minorities, but that price was one the Terry Court was willing to pay for
"effective crime prevention and detection."149
In later cases, the Supreme Court announced that race could not serve as the
sole basis for Fourth Amendment suspicion to justify a seizure, but also that non-
race-based indicia of suspicion could immunize seizures from further scrutiny for
141. The phrase "effective law enforcement" appears often in criminal procedure cases, often operating
to trump defendants' constitutional claims. For examples and further discussion, see Ristroph,
supra note 20, at 1603.
142. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
143. Id at 14.
144. Id at 14 n.11.
145. Id
146. Id at 14-15.
147. See Ristroph, supra note 20.
148. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19.
149. Id at 22.
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racial bias.so In Whren v. United States,'' the Court was invited directly to
address racial profiling, and it declined to do so.' 52 The case involved two young
black defendants who had been stopped by District of Columbia vice officers,
purportedly for remaining too long at an intersection.s' Under local regulations,
these particular officers were not authorized to make traffic stops except in cases
of immediate danger, and the defendants argued that the traffic violation was a
pretext to shield a racially motivated search for drugs.154
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia did not mention the de-
fendants' race in the initial description of the facts, but later acknowledged the
racial dimensions of the case: "Petitioners, who are both black, further contend
that police officers might decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly
impermissible factors, such as the race of the car's occupants."' In response, the
Whren Court simply reaffirmed that an officer's actual motivations were irrelevant
to Fourth Amendment analysis so that probable cause of any legal violation oper-
ated as a safe harbor for police.' 6 Selective, racially motivated enforcement of the
criminal law could violate the Constitution, the Court said, but such claims
would have to be litigated under the Equal Protection Clause rather than the
Fourth Amendment.'1 As one federal district judge has complained, one function
of Whren is to "enlist the judiciary as an accomplice (albeit sometimes an
unknowing one) to race or ethnicity-based police actions, by foreclosing even a
detailed look, in a criminal case, into whether invidious race or [ethnic] discrimi-
nation played a role in police conduct."is
A final case worth noting was not litigated as a racial bias case; nor is it typi-
cally classified as a use-of-force case. Nevertheless, the implications ofAtwater v.
150. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-16 (1996); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975) (finding that "Mexican appearance" was not, by itself, sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation, but suggesting that Mexican appearance
could be a relevant factor in conjunction with other indicia of suspicion).
151. 517 U.S. 806.
152. See id at 813-15, 818-19.
153. Id at 808, 810.
154. Id at 815. The defendants' brief identified them as "young black men" and discussed the racially
disparate use of traffic stops across the United States. Brief for the Petitioners at 2, 21-27, Whren,
517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841), 1996 WL 75758, at *2, *21-27.
155. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
156. See id at 813.
157. Id Equal protection doctrine requires proof of discriminatory intent and has been no more
effective in constraining racial profiling. See Harcourt, supra note 9; Leipold, supra note 78.
158. United States v. Uriostegui, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (M.D. Ala. 2006). Here, the court's
opinion in the Federal Supplement is mistakenly reported to have used the word "ethic" instead of
"ethnic." See id.
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City ofLago Vista.' for the racial distribution of police force are important-and
were identified in a strong dissenting opinion signed by four Justices.' Atwater
involved the custodial arrest of a (white) so-called soccer mom for a seatbelt
violation in Texas, an arrest characterized by the Court as a "gratuitous
humiliation[] imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely
poor judgment."161 The Atwater majority repeated the argument, familiar
from Graham v. Connor,'62 that the pressures under which police officers
make decisions-the very pressures of time and circumstance that may lead po-
lice to make bad decisions-should render judges reluctant to second-guess those
decisions.' Invoking Whren, the Atwater Court reaffirmed, again, that probable
cause to suspect a legal violation-even a seatbelt violation not punishable with
jail time-was sufficient to justify a seizure, including a custodial arrest."
Whren had been decided unanimously five years earlier, but in Atwater, four
Justices dissented with an opinion that demonstrates the importance of the seizure
continuum-the line between the initial police-citizen encounter and subsequent
uses of force-and the Court's awareness of the racially disparate ways in which
that continuum is likely to be traversed. To Justice O'Connor and the other
dissenters, Whren did not resolve the issue in Atwater because Whren authorized
at most the initial traffic stop. The dissent emphasized "significant qualitative
differences between a traffic stop and a fuill custodial arrest," including the longer
duration of an arrest and an arrestee's greater physical subordination and vulnera-
bility.' The dissent did not specifically characterize an arrest as a use of force,
but of course it involves acts that we would recognize as forceful or violent in other
contexts: Gail Atwater was handcuffed,' 66 detained in a police car, transported to
the police station,' 7 searched, and held in a jail cell for an hour.' 8 When police
wish to "escalate the seizure" in this way, the dissent argued they should have to
159. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
160. Id at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor's dissent. See id
161. Id. at 346-47 (majority opinion). The arresting officer had apparently stopped the same woman
previously on suspicion of a seatbelt violation but had, in the previous instance, realized he was
wrong. Id. at 324 n.1.
162. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
163. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
164. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
165. Id at 363-64 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
166. As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has characterized the use of handcuffs as a use of force.
Muchler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99 (2005).
167. "Ironically, [the arresting officer] did not secure Atwater in a seatbelt for the drive [to the police
station]." Atwater, 532 U.S. at 369 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
168. Id at 324 (majority opinion).
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identify "specific and articulable facts which ... reasonably warrant [the additional]
intrusion."16
One seizure can easily lead to a more intrusive seizure, and the dissent would
have required independent justification for any movement up the continuum.
Such independent justification is particularly important given the ease with
which officers step onto the continuum-that is, the ease with which an initial
stop is justified. Atwater may have been a white woman, but the dissenters
reminded their colleagues that the usual targets of stops are not. "[A]s the recent
debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too dearly, a relatively minor traffic
infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individ-
ual."' The majority's decision only extended "the arsenal" available to an officer
who made a racially motivated stop."' As the dissent recognized, Atwater protects
punitive (or racially motivated) decisions to arrest by offering the safe harbor of
probable cause. Other punitive (or racially motivated) decisions to use force are
similarly protected in the safe harbor of suspected nonsubmission. Race has rarely
been at the center of the doctrinal discussions that erected these safe harbors, but
it has always been in the background.
Another lens through which to understand the distributional consequences
of Fourth Amendment doctrine: Together, the permissibility of race-motivated
seizure decisions and the prohibition of resistance create an affirmative race-
specific duty to comply. On the surface, constitutional doctrine expects and even
demands suspects' compliance across the board, whatever the race of the suspect.
But as early as Terry v. Ohio, the Court knew who the usual suspects would be
and thus who would bear the burden of compliance. As discussed above, the Terry
majority acknowledged the intrusiveness of a stop, its use as a tool of racial
harassment, and the "strong resentment" that a stop might provoke.172 But the
majority apparently concluded that these were costs that reasonably suspicious
persons must bear and said nothing about an individual's ability to confine the
intrusion or decline to cooperate. Justice White's Temy concurrence did address
the issue, emphasizing that police authority to stop an individual did not imply
the individual's duty to cooperate. "Of course, the person stopped is not obliged
169. Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)).
170. Id. at 372.
171. Id.
172. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 (noting "[tihe wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain"); id at 17
(describing a stop as "a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment"); id at 25 (stating that a stop "must surely be an annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience").
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to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis
for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued ob-
servation.""'
Over the next several decades, however, it has become clear that Justice
White's protection of noncooperation during a stop is at odds with official
doctrinal standards. The Court eventually upheld a "stop-and-identify" statute
that requires at least some cooperation with police during a Terry stop, dismissing
Justice White's assertion of a right not to comply as dicta.' 74 And various federal
courts have held that noncooperation can serve as a basis for increased suspicion,
extended detention, and in some instances, the use of additional physical force. 7 s
The Supreme Court occasionally refers to a right to refuse to cooperate with police
but only in the context of entirely suspicionless encounters."' Even in that context,
noncooperation may serve as one factor among others that triggers the suspicion
necessary to make a seizure."' And once police have that minimal suspicion
(objectively determined, without regard for any actual or race-based motiva-
tions), noncompliance is no longer protected.
2. The Scholarly Veneration of Compliance
The demand for compliance that pervades both police department policies and
constitutional doctrine is evident in scholarly work as well, especially in the
173. Id at 34 (White, J., concurring).
174. See Hiibelv. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187, 190-91 (2004) (upholding a conviction
for refusal to identify oneself during a Tery stop and characterizing Justice White's claim as
noncontrolling dicta and concluding that "[t]he principles of Terry permit a State to require a
suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop").
175. See, e.g., Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding in the qualified
immunity context that, under a reasonable interpretation of the law, an individual has no right
under the Fourth Amendment or other constitutional provisions to refuse to answer questions
during a Terry stop and could be arrested for obstruction of justice); Cunningham v. Bums, No.
3:12-CV-1824-L, 2014 WL 4707391, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22,2014) (finding that a suspect's
refusal to answer questions during a traffic stop justified lengthening the duration of the stop); see
also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) ("[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent
factor in determining reasonable suspicion.").
176. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,437 (1991) ("[A] refusal to cooperate, without more, does
not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."); Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("The person approached [by an officer
who lacks reasonable suspicion] ... need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may
decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way."); cf Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S.
284, 291-92 (1963) ("[O]ne cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if
that command is itself violative of the Constitution."). As discussed below, the Court once went so
far as to recognize a right to resist unlawful arrest, but that right also belonged exclusively to the
innocent. See infra Part I.B.2.
177. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.
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substantial and influential literatures on procedural justice and community policing.
Both sets of literature (which overlap, since some commentators see community
policing as a way to operationalize principles of procedural justice) are framed as
progressive theories of police reform-as arguments about how to make policing
better."' To a striking degree, though, both theories emphasize the degree to
which they will make suspects better by making them more compliant. Put differ-
ently, a major selling point of each theory, the value that each promises to add, is
greater cooperation with the police. Tom Tyler, the founding dean of contem-
porary procedural justice scholarship, begins candidly with the question, why do
people obey the law, and looks to procedures to foster more obedience."' On
Tyler's account, compliance is not simply an incidental benefit of fair procedures;
it is the goal:
The key argument of the process-based approach is that, while
the police can and often do compel obedience through the threat or
use of force, they can also gain the cooperation of the people with
whom they deal. Cooperation and consent-"buy in"-are important
because they facilitate immediate acceptance and long-term compli-
ance. 180
Similarly, those who advocate community policing focus on the cultivation
of compliance. In one early description, community-oriented policing is motivated
by recognition of "the significance of community trust and cooperation."1 s
Another description emphasizes that the community policing model fosters "a
two-way working relationship between the community and the police, in which
178. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21sT CENTURY POLICING (2015) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT], https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce.finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/44
TIJ-VCZ7] (endorsing increased emphasis on procedural justice and community policing).
179. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (2006).
180. Tom R Tyler, ProceduralJustice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule ofLaw, 30 CRIME &JUST. 283,
286 (2003). Tyler's sometime co-author Tracey Meares has suggested that compliance is a mere
incidental side benefit of an approach she calls "rightful policing," or "policing that is both lawful
and procedurally just." Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing theDfference Between Lawful or
Effective Policing and Righful Policing-and Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865,
1878-79 (2013). But procedural justice is defined as that which produces (sociological, not
normative) legitimacy, and legitimacy is defined as the property of a rule or authority that leads
people to feel obligated to obey. Id at 1875. Obedience and compliance are central to Meares's
conception of ideal policing, not just byproducts of it.
181. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE INNOVATION
IN SIX AMERICAN CiTIES 10-11, 211 (1986).
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the police become more integrated into the local community and citizens assume
an active role in crime control and prevention." 182
To be sure, the champions of procedural justice and community policing
seek voluntary compliance with the police, specifically distinguishing such
compliance from submission motivated by fear. But these commentators seek
voluntary compliance with thepolice-with the state agents who are the usual entry
point into prosecution, conviction, and punishment. That we are asking indi-
viduals to cooperate in their own prosecutions and punishments is sometimes
obscured, or deliberately minimized, in the literature, especially by community
policing proponents. They frequently emphasize that police do much more than
investigate crime and make arrests, and that is surely true.' But when police
encounter criminality, whether because they are looking for it or because they
stumble upon it while performing some other function, they are empowered and
expected to do something about it. And doing something about it very frequently
entails triggering the mechanisms of the criminal justice system. When we
cultivate and celebrate compliance with the police, we cultivate and celebrate
compliance with punishment.
That implication is not often emphasized-and again, is sometimes
deliberately minimized-among procedural justice and community policing
scholars, but at least some of those commentators would probably be untroubled
by it. Both theories of policing reform take for granted the basic normative legiti-
macy of the criminal law and the punishments it imposes. If an individual is in
fact guilty, we should want him to accept and even facilitate his own punishment,
it might be argued. This view, of course, is not exactly adversarial, but that is the
point. These theories are anti-adversarial; they advocate a system that will make
crimes easier to detect, evidence easier to gather, suspects easier to apprehend and
ultimately, easier to punish.
182. SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA- AN INTRODUCTION
532 (5th ed. 2005). Many advocates of community policing emphasize not just compliance with
the police but "social compliance" more broadly. They thus often support "order-maintenance"
policing and discretionary use of loitering, vagrancy, or panhandling laws to police noncompliance.
See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 999, 1011
(2013) (noting without endorsing the emphasis on "social compliance").
183. For example, Debra Livingston distinguishes "community caretaking intrusions" (such as safety
inspections, responses to missing person reports, or patrols of unsecured premises) from "the
adversarial business of enforcing the criminal law." Debra Livingston, Police, Community
Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CH. LEGAL F. 261, 286. Both the distinction
and the phrasing are both potentially misleading. Most objections to "community caretaking"
activities arise after police use information discovered while caretaking to initiate a criminal
prosecution. Additionally, courts and officers often seem to deny that policing should be adversarial
at all suspects are expected to comply with the police and save their resistance for the courtroom.
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Now put these calls for compliance in the context of America's existing
criminal justice system. No doubt many of those who seek to foster greater com-
pliance with police officers are acutely aware of, and critical of, problems in that
system, from overcriminalization to racial bias to excessive punishment. Those
who seek police reform are likely to endorse broader criminal justice reform as
well. But note that existing imperfections in the criminal justice system are not
viewed as a basis to refuse to cooperate with, evade, or resist the police. Instead,
those most burdened by the racial bias of criminal law enforcement have the most
to lose from noncompliance and thus the greatest duties of compliance.'84 Mem-
bers of minority communities often understand this burden, even if they do not
appreciate it. In recent years, black parents have emphasized publicly that "the
talk," a difficult conversation that parents must have with their maturing chil-
dren, refers in black families not (or not only) to explanations of sex and sexual
safety, but to explanations of police bias and advice for safety in police encoun-
ters.' The advice is: Do what they say, and don't argue.
But compliance with the police is not itself cost-free. In many instances, it
is merely the less costly of two unattractive alternatives. As the discussion of
near-seizures in Part I illustrated, cooperation with the police will often be taken
as evidence that the entire encounter was consensual and thus not subject to
Fourth Amendment suspicion requirements. A young black man approached by
an officer on the sidewalk, airport concourse, or bus should comply to maximize
his physical safety, but in doing so he may lose any hope of a successful subsequent
constitutional challenge to the police encounter.' Compliance may also facilitate
the suspect's own prosecution and punishment, and this is true for innocent
suspects as well as guilty ones.' 7 Finally, compliance may not even be enough to
184. "Never get into a verbal confrontation.. . .Never! Comply with the officer. If it means getting
down on the ground, then get down on the ground. Comply with whatever the officer is asking
you to do." KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: WHAT TO Do IF You ARE A
VIcTIM OF RACIAL PROFILING 138 (2000). Given this racial burden of compliance, the
Supreme Court's ostensibly race-neutral test to determine whether a seizure has occurred-
whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave-will only magnify racial disparities.
Black suspects will likely feel they must submit in situations that courts will later find to be nonseizures,
precisely because a reasonable (white) person would have felt free to leave. See supra Part IA.
185. See, e.g., Geeta Gandbhir & Blair Foster, ' Conversation With My Black Son,' N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/opinion/a-conversation-with-my-black-
son.htnl [http://perma.cc/SNF4-HJV4].
186. See supra Part IA. See generally Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to
Comply. Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483 (2007)
(noting inconsistencies between the compliance that is widely expected of those who encounter the
police and the resistance necessary to preserve one's rights under constitutional doctrine).
187. As Josh Bowers has shown, our criminal justice system often imposes punishment both on the
legally innocent and the "normatively innocent," and this punishment is often achieved with
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protect physical safety, should the officer misinterpret compliance as resistance.
Compliance may save a black man's life; it is unlikely to preserve his rights, dignity,
or autonomy.
A sweeping demand for compliance with the police, and condemnation of
resistance, thus pervades the police profession, constitutional doctrine, and much
scholarly writing.' 8 The next Part contrasts this view with a very different
approach-not to endorse the alternative view, but to invite reassessment of con-
temporary attitudes toward resistance. The zero-tolerance approach to resistance,
which shapes police training and is endorsed by Fourth Amendment doctrine, is
deeply at odds with purported American commitments to individual agency and
limited government. Moreover, given the pronounced racial disparities among
the targets of police suspicion and the eventual recipients of punishment, a zero-
tolerance approach to resistance also suggests indifference to very real complaints
that might be lodged against the front line of the criminal justice system. No,
worse than indifference-the zero-tolerance approach knowingly penalizes those
who are already most burdened by the criminal law and who have the most reason
to resist its enforcers.
B. Resistance as a Privilege
Today, resistance to a police officer is not simply a green light for the officer
to use force; it is also the target of widespread condemnation from the police and
the public at large. A zero-tolerance approach to resistance underlies police
training and ideology, and is also reflected in independent criminal offenses such
as resistance to an officer or evading arrest. In many segments ofAmerican society,
and in normative academic studies of criminal law and policing, the expectation is
that individuals should comply with the police. Particular officers may be abusive
or act unlawfully, it is acknowledged, but the remedy for such abuses should come
substantial cooperation from the innocent defendant. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 CoLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); Josh
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008). Enterprising prosecutors have
even argued that compliance with the police can itself establish probable cause to suspect the
individual of criminal activity, but at least at the Supreme Court, this argument was rejected.
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948) (describing, and rejecting, the government's
argument "that the officers could infer probable cause from the fact that Di Re did not protest his
arrest, did not at once assert his innocence, and silently accepted the command to go along to the
police station").
188. Some recent work has begun to question the celebration of compliance, especially as expressed by
procedural justice theorists. See, e.g., EricJ. Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and
ProceduralJustice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295; Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 391 (2016) (urging greater attention to, and protection of, contestation of police as a method
of political participation).
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from the state itself. Self-help against police authority is seen as itself a mark of
bad character. Individuals are expected to trust that the state will fix its own
mistakes down the road through post-arrest review.
But even as America condemns some forms of resistance by some people,
other forms of resistance by other sorts of people are celebrated as central to
American political traditions. This Subpart examines two independent venerations
of resistance: First, a common law right to resist unlawful arrest was once
recognized widely in American states. In addition, the recently resurgent Second
Amendment right to bear arms is premised on the claim that the prospect of
government tyranny allegedly necessitates an armed citizenry.189 Each of these
rights has, in at least some instances, appeared as a racial privilege, and each
calls into question ostensibly race-neutral explanations for the disapproval of
resistance in Fourth Amendment doctrine. Part II.B.1 examines those putative
race-neutral explanations. Part II.B.2 considers the heyday and decline of the
common law right to resist arrest, and Part II.B.3 evaluates the new embrace of
Second Amendment resistance rights.
1. The Foil: Procedural Perfectionism
A certain political theory, one that could be characterized as a kind of pro-
cedural perfectionism, offers a race-neutral justification for this condemnation of
resistance. Under this perfectionist view, the claim is not that the police are perfect
or expected to become so, but that the state is perfect, or expected to become so, if
given enough time, enough process, and enough opportunities to review and cor-
rect.190 Individuals must never resist state agents, but rather must wait for the
state to correct its own mistakes. We hear an appeal to this perfectionist view in
the immediate aftermath of each police shooting when city officials and police
189. See infra Part II.B.3.
190. Among philosophers, perfectionism or liberal perfectionism often refers to the view that the state
should promote a particular vision of the good (life), and should seek to inculcate virtue in citizens.
See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 426 (1986) ("[P]erfectionist
doctrine ... holds the state to be duty-bound to promote the good life."). This view is perfectionist
in that the state should seek to perfect its citizens. I use the term perfectionism more consistently
with its use among constitutional theorists, for whom perfectionism sometimes describes a state
that seeks to, or does, perfect itself. Exactly what aspect of the state is to be perfected and how
perfection is to be achieved are matters of dispute. In Ely's process perfectionism, judicial review
should seek to perfect the processes of representative government rather than adjudicate substantive
values. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980). Proponents of substantive due process have been criticized for a different perfectionism in
which they assume that the Constitution aligns with and enforces current understandings of
substantive justice. See Henry P. Monaghan, OurPe fect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 358
(1981).
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leaders plead with citizens to remain calm, to wait for information, to "respect the
process" and to await the state's own conclusions about what, if anything, went
wrong and what, if anything, should be done.'
In this race-neutral account, the directive to be patient and allow the state to
correct its own racial injustices is the same directive that would be given to victims
of any other official injustice. For example, unreasonable prohibitions in the
substantive criminal law, prosecutorial bias, or excessive punishments should be
addressed through formal political and legal processes. An individual should not
engage in self-help by seeking to avoid contact with police altogether or by resisting
an officer.'92 The state's flaws are to be perfected by the state itself, on its own
terms, on its own time. The individual must trust the process-including both
the political process and the adjudicative one-to get it right eventually.
Individuals should comply, even if compliance leads to injustice down the road,
and simply trust that remedies for that injustice will lie still farther down the
road. Indeed, individuals should comply even if compliance produces an
immediate injustice-even if the police officer acts without legal authority.
Again, the state must be given time to correct its own mistakes; the illegally arrested
individual should seek relief through later judicial review of the officer's actions.
Of course, the perfectionist view does not emphasize the reality that judges of-
ten decline to "second-guess" an officer's decisions, and that compliance by
an individual may be viewed by courts as demonstrating that state agents never
did anything wrong in the first place.'
Such perfectionism apparently underlies much of criminal procedure, and it
underlies the procedural justice literature on police reform discussed in the previous
Part. But before we conclude that the demand for compliance is the race-neutral
product of our underlying political philosophy, we should notice this: The perfec-
tionist view is deeply at odds with another view of the state, and individual rights
191. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 116 ("In a now-familiar refrain . . . the authorities pledge an
impartial and thorough criminal investigation and beseech the public to be patient. Whatever the
outcome, the authorities' main message is that the public should'respect' the process.").
192. Nor, on the perfectionist view, should individuals practice self-help by thwarting state procedures.
Without using the language of procedural perfectionism that I invoke here, many of the critiques of
Paul Butler's call for race-based jury nullification expressed similar perfectionist ideas. Butler
famously proposed a kind of (non-violent) self-help among African Americans called for jury
service, urging them to acquit African American defendants in at least some cases even when the
evidence suggested actual guilt. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nulification: Black Power in the
CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE LJ. 677 (1995). Critics charged that Butler's proposal would
only exacerbate racial tensions and would be less effective than prosecutorial or legislative reform.
See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor
Butler, 44 UCLA L. REv. 109 (1996) (arguing that Butler should champion legislative change
directly).
193. See notes 186-187 and accompanying text for a discussion of compliance costs.
The Constitution of Police Violence :1229
of resistance, that is arguably more familiar in American political narratives. On
this alternative and decidedly nonperfectionist view, the only good government is
limited government, and every government--even limited government-bears
the potential of future oppression.'94 Consequently, individuals retain natural
rights of resistance, and they must be vigilant should the occasion arise to exercise
those rights. This narrative has occupied a prominent position in American self-
understanding since the Revolution. It is the narrative that justifies the colonists'
violent rejection of British authority and the principle that underwrites much of
the federal constitution. 195
The next two sections examine two incarnations of the nonperfectionist
embrace of resistance that are especially important as we reflect on resistance and
compliance with the modern police. First, a common law right to resist unlawful
arrest was once recognized widely in American states. In addition, Second
Amendment doctrine and discourse today are premised on the claim that the
prospect of government tyranny allegedly necessitates an armed citizenry."' In
light of these traditions of resistance, the perfectionist call for compliance with
police is less convincing as a race-neutral explanation for existing doctrinal rules.
It may be that the race-specific burden of compliance exists alongside a race-
specific privilege of resistance.
2. The Right to Resist Arrest
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, most American states and the
Supreme Court recognized and even celebrated a common law "right" to resist
unlawful arrest.' This was not actually a right in the usual sense of a fully
protected action, shielded from state interference. The practical import of the
so-called right to resist unlawful arrest was typically limited to provocation
194. See Alice Ristroph, Prcportionality as a Principle ofLimited Government, 55 DUKE LJ. 263, 285-86
(2005).
195. Alexander Hamilton, a committed advocate of strong government, somewhat ingeniously invoked
a natural right to resist oppressive government as an argument against constitutional limitations on
Congress's power to make war. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 205 (Alexander Hamilton) (David
Wootton ed., 2003) ("If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no
resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense, which is paramount to all
positive forms of'government. . .
196. See infra Part I.B.3.
197. The American courts adopted an English common law right that some trace back to 1215 and the
Magna Carta, a right that had been judicially vindicated at least since 1666. See Paul G. Chevigny,
The Right to Resist an UnlawfidArrest, 78 YALE LJ. 1128, 1129-32 (1969); Craig Hemmens &
Daniel Levin, "Not a Law atAll":A Callfor a Return to the Common Law Right to Resist Unlawfid
Arrest, 29 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 13-18 (1999). Each of these sources provides a thorough historical
overview of the right to resist arrest, and I will not attempt to recreate a complete history here.
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arguments in homicide cases. In that context, the fact that a defendant had been
resisting an unlawful arrest might reduce murder charges to manslaughter."' But
the conceptual framework around the right to resist unlawful arrest is noteworthy,
especially in its contrast to the ideology of compliance so prominent in much
contemporary doctrine and discourse.
The right to resist unlawful arrest first appears in judicial opinions as a claim
to use altruistic violence-to stop the unlawful arrest of a third party. The first
recorded case to recognize the right was a 1666 English decision addressing the
criminal liability of men who had killed a state official trying to impress a third
party into the King's army. The target of the impressment, or arrest, had not
himself resisted, but of the men who intervened on his behalf, the English court
said, "[I]f a man be unduly arrested or restrained of his liberty . .. this is a provo-
cation to all other men of England, not only his friends but strangers also for
common humanity sake.""' A similar sense of collective outrage is evident in a
1710 opinion, also reducing a murder charge to manslaughter after a constable
was killed, reasoning: "[A] man ought to be concerned for Magna Charta and the
laws; and if any one against the law imprisons a man, he is an offender against
Magna Charta. We seven hold this to be a sufficient provocation. . . ."2  Notably,
in both these early right to resist opinions, the defendants who killed the arresting
officer were not themselves the intended arrestees, eliminating, perhaps, the sug-
gestion of self-interested efforts to avoid deserved punishment.
After independence, American states retained resistance to unlawful arrest
as a rationale to reduce murder charges to manslaughter. And as in the early
English cases, the primary rationale was that assertions of arbitrary or unjustified
state power would provoke a reasonable man to act rashly. "So great ... is man's
natural indignation at an unlawful infringement upon his liberty that it is the
general rule in England and this country that, if a public officer be resisted and
killed by a person whom he is attempting to illegally arrest without color or
authority of law, the killing will be manslaughter only. .. ."201 The Supreme
Court recognized the right to resist unlawful arrest in a federal murder prosecution
in 1900, also suggesting the need to accommodate those who kill in reaction to
illegitimate assertions of authority. "[Where the officer is killed in the course of
the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the
198. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 61 So. 336, 339 (Ala. 1913) ("A person seeking unlawfiuly to arrest
another is a trespasser, and the trespass is a ground of provocation sufficient to reduce the homicide
of such person in resistance of the arrest from murder to manslaughter...
199. Hopkin Huggett's Case (1666) 84 Eng. Rep. 1082, 1082 (KB.).
200. Queen v. Tooley (1710) 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 353 (QB.); 2 Ld. Raym. 1296,1301-02.
201. People v. Scalisi, 154 N.E. 715, 722 (Ill. 1926).
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law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the
right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer had no such right."202
Like almost every aspect of the American criminal justice system, the right
to resist unlawfil arrest was shadowed by race. At least some of the recognizably
unlawful arrests were naked harassment of black citizens by white officials.203
These defendants sometimes benefitted from a right to resist jury instruction and
sometimes did not.204 The reported opinions, most ofwhich do not mention race
at all, do not themselves reveal or preclude patterns of racial bias in the application
of the right to resist unlawful arrest. But it is striking to see, in southern states
during the era of Jim Crow, that courts at least sometimes recognized and
accommodated violent resistance by black Americans against law enforcement
officers.
Over time, some state courts began to explain the right to resist unlawful
arrest as a branch of self-defense doctrine rather than as part of the traditional
provocation framework.0 . This shift allowed some defendants to avoid criminal
liability altogether (rather than merely reduce the degree of homicide), though
courts imposed proportionality and necessity constraints on the use of deadly
force to resist an arrest. The shift to self-defense altered the rhetoric, producing
appeals to individual liberty, natural rights, and self-preservation that Cliven
Bundy, Tea Party members, and Second Amendment enthusiasts could embrace
today.206 But such individualistic, libertarian rhetoric was a latter-day rationaliza-
tion for a principle that originated in recognition of imperfections both political
and personal. As first articulated in provocation doctrine, the right to resist
unlawful arrest sought to understand the reasons for violent resistance without
202. John Bad Elkv. United States, 177 U.S. 529,537(1900).
203. In Jones v. State, 155 So. 430 (Miss. 1934), the Supreme Court of Mississippi found reversible error
after a black defendant was denied a jury instruction on the right to resist unlawful arrest. The
defendant's home had been searched, without warrant and without cause, and his young brothers
taken into custody by a constable named Mark Mason. Id at 430. Mason subsequently threatened
to tie rocks around the necks of the defendant's brothers and throw them into a creek. Id. The
defendant eventually returned home and went to bed, but later heard someone break into his front
door. Id He shot and killed the intruder, who turned out to be constable Mason. Id
204. Compare Jones, 155 So. at 432 (reversing a black defendant's conviction for murder of a white police
officer on the grounds that the defendant had been resisting unlawful arrest), with State v. Francis,
149 S.E. 348 (S.C. 1929) (upholding convictions of six "colored" defendants for murder of a white
police officer during the officer's attempt to make an admittedly illegal arrest, on the grounds that
the defendants had used disproportionate force to resist the arrest).
205. See, e.g., Perdue v. State, 63 S.E. 922, 923-25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909).
206. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. LJ. 939 (2011)
(examining connections between the common law right to resist unlawful arrest and the right of
self-defense articulated in District ofColumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonaldv. City
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)).
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celebrating its deadly results. A man facing an unlawful arrest might be suffi-
ciently provoked to kill the arresting officer, and though the law did not exonerate
him entirely, it mitigated the severity of the charge against him. Men are not
perfect, but neither is the state. The right to resist unlawful arrest thus reflected
some skepticism that the state would adequately fix its mistakes down the road.
And it sought to accommodate, rather than punish, outrage at the exercise of
arbitrary authority.2 07
Legal experts began to criticize the right to resist unlawful arrest in the mid-
twentieth century. One expert commission promulgated a model statute, the
Uniform Arrest Act, which directly prohibited any resistance to any arrest.208
Additionally, the Model Penal Code, drafted in the 1950s by the American Law
Institute and adopted in 1962, specifically excluded a right to resist unlawful arrest
from its definition of self-defense. 209 The mid-century critics of the right por-
trayed it as a carryover from days of deplorable conditions in jails and prisons, a
mechanism of self-preservation no longer necessary in a modem world with more
humane places of detention.210 Critics of the right also suggested that ex post
judicial review would provide adequate remedies for illegal arrests.211 Furthermore,
a right to resist unlawful arrest could lead to resistance of any and all arrests, since
suspects would often mistake lawful arrests for unlawful ones. Perhaps most
powerfully, the critics argued that resistance to police officers would be futile for
the suspect and dangerous for everyone-for the usually armed officers who
would fire in return, for the suspect, and for any bystanders.212 These arguments
convinced courts and legislatures, and in the latter half of the twentieth century,
the majority of states abolished the right to resist unlawful arrest.213 The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue in decades-although it has
207. See Chevigny, supra note 197, at 1132.
208. See Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 345 (1942) ("If a person has
reasonable ground to believe that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is his duty to refrain from
using force or any weapon in resisting arrest regardless of whether or not there is a legal basis for the
arrest.").
209. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
210. See Warner, supra note 208, at 330. More recent commentators point out that the comnon law
cases recognizing a right to resist unlawful arrest did not discuss detention conditions at all but
instead focused on an illegal arrest as an affront to dignity and justice. See Hernmens & Levin,
supra note 197, at 9-11, 21-22.
211. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moreira, 447 N.E. 2d 1224,1227 (Mass. 1983).
212. See Warner, supra note 208, at 330.
213. See Hemmens & Levin, supra note 197, at 24-25.
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indirectly solved the problem of unlawful arrest by designating nearly all arrests as
laVful.214
The pragmatic arguments against a right to resist unlawful arrest are strong,
and it is perhaps more surprising that thirteen states retain the right than it is that so
much of the country has renounced it. 21 5 And courts have emphasized that even
where the right to resist unlawful arrest is recognized by state law, it has no bearing
on Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 216 Notably, the last significant academic
or public support for a right to resist arrest came during the 1960s and early
2171970s, from those involved in or supportive of civil rights protests. In many
respects, though, what I have called perfectionist views prevailed both as to resisting
214. See supra Part I.B (discussing broad scope of arrest authority under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996);Atwaterv. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); and, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S.
Ct. 530 (2014)).
215. See Miller, supra note 206, at 953.
216. See, e.g., Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a state
right to resist unlawfil arrest does not disrupt the Fourth Amendment authorization of an arrest
for assaulting an officer, based on the same resistance to arrest); Thompson v. City of Danville, No.
4:10CV00012, 2011 WL 2174536, at *7 (W.D. Va. June 3, 2011) ("Virginia's common law right
to resist an illegal arrest simply does not touch on the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
analysis."), affd, 457 F. App'x 221 (4th Cir. 2011).
217. See, e.g., Chevigny, supra note 197 (arguing, in 1969, for a right to resist unlawful arrest); Hemmens
& Levin, supra note 197, at 30-32. Noteworthy here is Wainwright v. City ofNew Orleans, 392
U.S. 598 (1968), originally scheduled to be argued before the Supreme Court during the same term
as Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The case involved a young Tulane law student, stopped on the
streets of New Orleans by police officers seeking a murder suspect (but apparently without
adequate suspicion of the law student in particular). Wainright, 392 U.S. at 600 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting). The young student refused to cooperate and repeatedly tried to leave. Id at 600-01.
Police took him to the station and ordered him to remove his jacket so they could check whether he
had tattoos matching the description of the suspect. Id. at 601. The student refused, crouching
and crossing his arms, but police forcibly removed the jacket. (He had no tattoos.) Id at 601-02.
The student was charged and convicted for assaulting officers, resisting officers, and "reviling the
police." Id at 602. On appeal he argued that the arrest had been unlawful and that the Fourth
Amendment protected his (minimal) resistance to the officers' efforts to remove his jacket. Id at
603. One week after issuing its opinion in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ in
Wainwright as improvidently granted. Id at 598 (per curiam). Justice Douglas wrote a
characteristically impassioned dissent, arguing that the facts showed the significant dangers of
Tery
I fear the long and short of it is that an officer's 'seizure' of a person on the street,
even though not made upon 'probable cause,' means that if the suspect resists
the 'seizure,' he may then be taken to the police station for further inquisition.
That is a terrifying spectacle .... I fear that with Terry and with Wainwright we
* have forsaken the Western tradition and taken a long step toward the oppressive
police practices not only of Communist regimes but of modem Iran, 'democratic'
Formosa, and Franco Spain, with which we are now even more closely allied.
Id. at 614-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren, who had authored the majority
opinion in Terry, also dissented in Wainwright. He argued that the arrest was unlawful, and that
the state court mistakenly characterized the arrest as lawful and thus failed to consider Louisiana's
recognition of a right to resist unlawful arrest. Id at 607-09 (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
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arrest and as to civil rights reform more broadly: Any disobedience should be civil
and nonviolent, accepting subsequent punishments; institutions should be
reformed from within; and the state must be given time and opportunity to fix its
past mistakes ("with all deliberate speed").218  Even beyond the arena of civil
rights, the twentieth century saw significant shifts in attitudes toward government
power; much of the country came to accept expansive regulatory and enforce-
ment powers as necessary or even welcome.
3. Second Amendment Resistance Rights
The idea that government, especially big government, is fundamentally
untrustworthy and prone to tyranny has never fully disappeared from American
public discourse, however. The notion that individuals must be vigilant against
government excess and prepared to resist it flourished in discussions of the right
to bear arms throughout the twentieth century. And early in the twenty-first
century, the Supreme Court endorsed this notion in District of Columbia v.
Heller,219 which found the Second Amendment to codify a "pre-existing" indi-
vidual right to bear arms for self-defense.220 Such a right would prove useful
against private violence, of course, but private violence was not the primary threat
identified by the Heller Court as the rationale for enshrining an individual right to
bear arms in the Bill of Rights. Instead, seeking to explain why the Second
Amendment's reference to "a well-regulated militia" was not a limitation of the
right to bear arms to those in official military units, the Court emphasized the need
to protect against government tyranny.221 "It was understood across the political
spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might
be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke
down."2 2 To be clear, the right to bear arms is a right to use them against the
state itself should it become oppressive.
218. "[With all deliberate speed" is the Supreme Court's infamous recommendation for the integration
of formerly segregated public schools. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). To
many racial minorities and civil rights activists, the integration process proved far too slow. See
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Commentary, All Deliberate Speed Rejiections on the First Half-Century of
Brown v. Board of Education, 66 MONT. L. REv. 283 (2005).
219. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
220. Id at 592.
221. See id at 598-600.
222. Id at 599. Justice Scalia's majority opinion went on to explain that at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted, most Americans probably saw the right to bear arms as most important for "self-
defense and hunting." Id Nevertheless, the Heller majority argued, the rationale for codifying the
right to bear arms in the new Bill of Rights was a concern about government oppression. Id
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In practice, the right to bear arms has been recognized in racially selective
ways. After the Civil War, blacks were routinely denied a right to bear arms.223
The Heller Court used this very selectivity, and critiques of it, to support the claim
that the right to bear arms has always been understood as an individual right rather
than a right of militia members. 224 Thus, a right of blacks to resist oppressive
government was ostensibly part of Hellers normative vision. Unsurprisingly, that
aspect of the decision has been overlooked, as have the similar but more detailed
arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago,225 which held that the Second
Amendment constrained state and local governments as well as the federal
government. 226 To establish the individual right to bear arms as "fundamental,"
and thus incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, the
McDonald majority described at length post-Civil War efforts by state and local
officials to disarm former slaves, which then prompted federal legislation
designed to counter those race-based disarmament efforts.227 It is easy to imagine
that Justice Scalia delighted in this rhetorical strategy. Knowing that progressives
would critique sharply a recognition of an individual right to bear arms, he por-
trayed that right as part of the nation's long struggle against racial injustice.228
Whatever Justice Scalia's contrarian tendencies, he apparently never
contemplated the possibility that Second Amendment rights might cut into the
broad authority granted police in Fourth Amendment doctrine, and he certainly
did not call for armed resistance as a solution to racial bias in the criminal justice
system. But if he did not notice these implications of Heller, others did.229 A few
commentators have observed that Heller's resistance ideology is simply incom-
patible with Fourth Amendment doctrine and existing police practices.230 For
example, the Fourth Amendment emphasis on officer safety allows police to frisk
for weapons and seize them during a Tery stop, but Heller might be read to protect
a "right to remain armed." 231 One could eliminate at least some of the con-
tradictions by curtailing Second Amendment rights, but there are risks with that
223. See id at 614.
224. Id at 614-16.
225. 561 U.S. 742(2010).
226. Id
227. Id. at770-76.
228. Justice Scalia authored the Heller majority opinion, but merely joined Justice Alito's majority
opinion in McDonald.
229. See, e.g., Kindaka Sanders, A Reason to Resist: The Use ofDeadly Force in Aiding Victims of Unlawful
PoliceAggression, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 695 (2015) (arguing that Heller and McDonald support a
right to use force against abusive police officers).
230. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2015); Miller, supra
note 206; Sanders, supra note 229.
231. Bellin, supra note 230, at 6.
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approach: The rights of armed resistance may be curtailed in ostensibly race-
neutral but actually racially selective ways. Already Heller (and McDonald)
obliquely preserved the possibility of at least some race-based disarmament by
insisting that felons could be permissibly barred from possessing guns.232 This
may seem a race-neutral principle of disarmament, but to be a felon is not, of
course, a naturally arising condition. Felon is a legal classification, and individuals
are transformed into felons by the same law enforcement processes that subject
blacks to higher levels of police surveillance, intrusion, and violence. Unsur-
prisingly, the American felonry is disproportionately black.233
In application, then, rights of resistance are likely to prove no more race-
neutral than the duties of compliance. This Part has juxtaposed resistance rights
with compliance duties not to show that either ideology will yield racial equality,
but rather to illustrate two perspectives on the distribution of violence. On the
most generous interpretation, the principle of compulsory compliance discussed
in Part II.A seeks to minimize overall violence by creating a monopoly on legit-
imate violence. In other words, when state officials are the only actors authorized
to use violence, they will wield their powers in ways that prevent violence by private
actors, and they will not use official violence unnecessarily (or in racially biased
ways). The theory of resistance rights, in contrast, is predicated on a belief that to
monopolize legitimate violence is to maximize violence, or at least, to run that
risk. The resistance theory of Heller does not deny the normative legitimacy of
some state violence, but it suggests that governments will abuse their authority to
use force unless checked by individuals with the technological means and legal
license to resist an oppressive state with counter-violence.234
This Article endorses neither strict requirements of compliance with police
nor wide-ranging rights of violent resistance. Instead, the aim is to reveal ways in
232. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (plurality opinion of Alito, J.); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570,626 (2008).
233. The overrepresentation of blacks among persons convicted of felonies in the United States has been
widely examined in literature and litigation concerning felon disenfranchisement. See, e.g., JAMIE
FELLNER &MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT
OF FELONY DISENFRANCISEMENT STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1998),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Losing-the-Vote-The-Impact-
of-Felony-Disenfranchisement-Laws-in-the-United-States.pdf[https://perma.cc/KP5Z-QR5L].
234. Advocates of gun rights also often argue that to democratize violence-to grant private individuals
legal license to bear and use weapons--will reduce overall levels of private violence (in addition to
deterring excessive state violence). As National Rifle Association President Wayne LaPierre is
fond of saying, "The only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun, is a good guy with a gun."
1VRA: Full Statement by Wayne LaPierre in Response to Newton Shootings, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21,
2012, 11:43 AM), http-//www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/21/nra-full-statement-lapierre-
newtown [http://perma.cc/B92N-DNPN]. The NRA position is that the "good guy" cannot
always be, and should not always be, an agent of the state. See id
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which rules of resistance and compliance distribute the risks of violence. If those
risks are distributed unequally, we have reason to reassess the underlying rules of
compliance and resistance.
III. ESCAPE
Killings by police officers of unarmed black men have provoked substantial
public outcry. In the calls for reform, there are several promising ideas. We could
train police to deescalate conflicts rather than follow the use-of-force continuum
to its logical conclusion.235 We could train officers on implicit racial bias, in the
hopes that they will learn to correct and control for it.236 We could scale back the
substantive criminal law, an enduring and unlikely proposal-but still a worthwhile
pursuit that would decrease the police-suspect encounters that so easily escalate to
violence. Along similar lines, we could limit the situations in which we authorize
and expect officers to make stops or arrests.237 To summon the political will to
make these reforms or any others effective, however, we must be honest about
how we got here. So far, the national conversation about police violence has
condemned the violence without taking responsibility for it-without admitting
that "the acts of the police, even when abusive, reflect the prevailing attitudes in
the society. "2
Some reform proposals focus on failures to indict officers who kill, as
occurred in Missouri after Michael Brown's death and in New York after Eric
Garner's. Scholars argue that such grand juries are the wrong decisionmakers or
that they reached the wrong conclusions. 239 It would not be surprising to find
235. See Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-escalate, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-use-force-police-
warily-learn-to-de-escalate.html?_r=0 (discussing efforts to train police in de-escalation tactics).
236. This is the aim of the Fair & Impartial Policing program and a key recommendation of the
President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 178, at
10-11; see also supra note 13.
237. See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307 (2016) (arguing for limitations on
the power to arrest); lan Ayres & Daniel Markovits, Ending Excessive Police Force Starts With New
Rules ofEngagernent, WASH. POST. (Dec. 25, 2014), http.//www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/ending-excessive-police-force-starts-with-new-rules-of-engagement/2014/12/25/7fa379cO-
8ale-11e4-a085-34e9b9f09a58 story.htmdutm term=.9b7efaeeaa02 [httpI//perma.cc/77CJ-
3SZP] (arguing that the police should issue tickets, rather than make arrests, for minor offenses).
238. Alexander Nazaryan, It's Bad Cap, Worse Cop in Police Power: Police Abuses in New York City,'
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 6, 2014, 10:34 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/its-bad-cop-worse-cop-
police-power-police-abuses-new-york-city-263210 [httpi//perma.cc/PJC7-MPFQ (quoting Paul
Chevigny).
239. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 12, at 1449 (referring to the nonindictments in the Garner and Brown
cases as indicative of "the dysfunction of our local, adversarial justice system"); Ben Trachtenberg,
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major flaws in the grand jury process. But punishing individual police officers
may be the wrong goal. In fact, the focus on holding individual officers accountable
is risky, for it allows courts, and the wider public, to avoid holding themselves
accountable.
Constitutional doctrine is made by judges in the last instance, but we should
not isolate a judge's vote or opinion any more than we should isolate an officer's
decision to pull the trigger. Doctrinal rules emerge from appellate advocacy, and
the specific rules that govern seizure authority are, for the most part, rules which
prosecutors and other law enforcement officials have urged courts to adopt."*
The prosecutors who have advocated for expansive police authority are, in turn,
representatives of that broad and amorphous constituency called "the public," or,
in the captions of many criminal cases, the People.24 1
The key point here is not that existing constitutional rules accurately reflect
the collective will of the people.242 The key point is that constitutional doctrine
authorizes and legitimates much of the police violence of recent years, and this
doctrine is purportedly crafted for the benefit of the people at large. The current
crisis in American policing-it seems fair, after the summer of 2016, to charac-
terize the situation as a crisis-is not a mere contest between black and blue. It is
an occasion to reexamine the rules for official violence-specifically, the violence
perpetrated for, tolerated by, and sometimes even demanded explicitly by the
People themselves.
Thus, one aim of this Article has been to develop a claim of shared respon-
sibility-to reveal judicial and public responsibility for the deaths of unarmed
black men. These deaths are the logical result of doctrinal rules that courts have
endorsed for decades. They are the logical result of policing practices that broad
segments of the public have tolerated and sometimes demanded. The deaths are,
at least in part, the product of the simple suspicion and nonsubmission formula
No, You "Stand Up"- Why Prosecutors Should Stop Hiding Behind GrandJuries, 80 MO. L. REV. 1099
(2015).
240. See supra Part I.
241. Many state courts caption criminal prosecutions as 'The People vs. [Defendant]." See, e.g., People
v. Rutterschmidt, 286 P.3d 435 (Cal. 2012). For a philosophical account of the prosecutor as
representative of the people, see MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, PROSECuING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: APH[LOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS (2009).
242. It is often debatable whether legislation itself reflects the collective will, even when it is produced by
majoritarian bodies comprised of elected representatives. For example, political scientists often
emphasize the influence of congressional committees on federal legislation, and the fact that
particular committee members answer to a local constituency rather than the nation as a whole.
Constitutional doctrine is not even designed or defended as an expression of the collective will, and
is at least sometimes explicitly counter-majoritarian. Nevertheless, there are often discernible lines
from doctrinal rules back to the arguments of prosecutors, and back further to the constituencies
served by those (often elected) prosecutors.
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that federal constitutional law uses to create a safe harbor for the use of force. To
get different results, we need a different formula.
Two broad categories of reforms are worth pursuing, each quite different
from the compliance-focused reforms of procedural justice and community
policing theorists. The two strategies I have in mind do not glorify resistance to
the police, but they respect the messages expressed by that resistance. The first
strategy focuses on the suspicion element of the basic seizure formula. This strategy
would seek to constrain police force ex ante by reducing the overall frequency of
seizures (and near-seizures). This strategy could include the long-demanded
reforms to the substantive criminal law mentioned above-straightforward
decriminalization of many offenses, so that police have fewer reasons to seize
persons. Beyond the substantive criminal law and within Fourth Amendment
doctrine, ex ante constraints on the use of force would require, first, recognizing
what I called "near-seizures" as seizures, and preventing police from using such
practices free ofjudicial scrutiny.
If police lack suspicion of an individual, they should not approach that indi-
vidual and single her out for questioning-, at a minimum, they should begin any
encounter by communicating clearly that the individual is free to decline
engagement. Further, even when the police have individualized suspicion of
some offense, they should make a seizure only when the particular offense
warrants immediate detention and investigation. This would mean many traffic
offenses-broken taillights, illegal lane changes-will be addressed simply by
recording the license plate and sending the registered owner a notice of violation.
Limiting near-seizures and traffic stops may not immediately seem important to
those concerned with police killings, but we have traversed the continuum too
many times; we know that the littlest intrusions turn into the biggest ones.
Already these proposals would make radical changes to existing criminal law
enforcement practices. Among other things, they would deny to police the option
to make the sweeps and pretextual stops that are key tactical maneuvers in the war
on drugs. Perhaps it would make fighting the drug war more difficult, or more
dangerous. As we have seen, Fourth Amendment doctrine distributes risks of
violence, and major revisions could redistribute those risks.243 But ifwe think the
existing distribution is unjust, we must be willing to explore alternatives.
A second reform strategy focuses on the other part of the seizure formula,
nonsubmission. Here I think more conceptual reorientation may be necessary.
243. See supra Part II. Cf William J. Stuntz, The Distribution ofFourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1265 (1999). Stuntz focused on the search doctrine, but the seizure doctrine of
course has similar distributive effects.
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The idea that suspicion thresholds are too low and too easily satisfied is already
widely accepted among criminal law scholars. The idea that nonsubmission
might be protected is less likely to win ready agreement. Except in rare instances-
standoffs with white militia members, for example-resistance to law enforcement
is not widely viewed as a principled or political act. It is framed as a bad guy trying
to save his own skin, or harm an officer, or both.
This, I think, is something we need to reassess. Framed as a right to resist
unlawful arrest, resistance was nominally a right of the innocent, not the guilty.
But on the street, the distinction between the innocent and the guilty is as weak
as the distinction between the right to resist unlawfil arrest and the right to resist
any arrest. Many defendants believe, inaccurately, that they didn't break any
laws, or they believe, accurately, that they didn't break any laws that really should
be laws. In still other cases, the individual knows he is guilty of some offense but
nonetheless resists arbitrary treatment. He resists the officer who has selected
him unfairly, or he resists the arrest record that will guarantee later discrimination;
or he resists the excessive sentence he will have to serve.
Eric Garner's last words became famous-"I can't breathe," repeated
eight times-but what he said to the police just seconds before is equally worth
remembering: "Every time you see me, you want to mess with me. I'm tired of it.
It stops today.. . . I'm minding my business .... Please just leave me alone."2"
Garner was not simply resisting one simple request to put his hands behind his
back. He was resisting the burdens of being perennially suspicious. And to be
clear, he was indeed suspicious, under the terms of criminal and constitutional
law, there is little question that he engaged in petty offenses that, as a doctrinal
matter, warrant police seizures. Once suspicious and nonsubmissive, he became a
legitimate target. He was resisting all of this, and for that resistance he was killed.
In almost any place and era, it is entirely understandable that individuals
facing punishment or other criminal justice intrusions would resist. In the United
States in the early twenty-first century, it is especially understandable that African
American men would resist contacts with police officers. To appreciate and
understand that resistance is not to embrace anarchy. For example, the decidedly
nonanarchist Thomas Hobbes defended a right to resist punishment as an im-
plication of a right of self-preservation.245 Of course, as a practical matter,
244. This was captured on video and widely quoted. For a transcript, see Susanna Capelouto, Eric
Garner: The Haunting Last Words of a Dying Man, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014, 7:31 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/04/us/gamer-last-words [http://perrna.cc/8JXX-S8XR].
245. See Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601 (2009)
(discussing Hobbes's theory of punishment). Interestingly, Hobbes also denied a broader right to
revolution-a right of "the people" to organize and overthrow a sovereign. THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 122 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996). Arguably, Hobbes defended the reverse of pre-Heller
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resistance to police officers today is more likely to destroy than to preserve oneself.
Nonetheless there are expressive dimensions to contemporary resistance that
Hobbes might recognize: It expresses a desire for self-preservation, for dignity,
for liberation from intrusions perceived to be arbitrary or unjust. It is an expression
of "natural indignation" at oppression, as American courts once recognized.24
We should again acknowledge and respect these efforts to assert autonomy in a
setting that has denied it.
There are at least two ways in which constitutional doctrine could and
should respect resistance, neither ofwhich embraces violence against police officers.
First, it could protect nonviolent noncompliance in the moment of a police-
civilian encounter. Individuals would have a right to walk away from an officer
who has not made a formal seizure, or a right to refuse cooperation without inviting
violent reprisals. To make this change, courts could no longer treat flight or
evasiveness as criteria sufficient (or nearly sufficient) to establish suspicion and
authorize a seizure.247 And courts would need to restore and adhere to Justice
White's promise in his Terry concurrence: "[T]he person stopped is not obliged
to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis
for arrest . ... "248
A second way to respect resistance focuses not on the moment of encounter
with the police officer, but on subsequent litigation. Quite simply, courts could
begin to give truth to one of the key arguments raised against a right to resist
unlawful arrest-they could fulfill the promise of ex post review of police seizures.
In terms of resistance, this strategy would offer more meaningful forms of legal
resistance in the hopes of discouraging physical resistance in the moment of the
encounter with an officer. I have argued elsewhere that most constitutional
claims raised by defendants, not only under the Fourth Amendment but under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well, are efforts to resist state coercion m van-
ous forms.249 Courts and commentators know that defendants resist punishment,
but seem uncomfortable acknowledging that dimension of constitutional criminal
procedure, and so have framed the field as a project of police regulation in which
defendants are mere bystanders.
Second Amendment doctrine, which had endorsed a collective right of resistance via state militias
but not an individual right to bear arms. In Darrell Miller's evocative terms, Hobbes saw at least
some forms of retail rebellion as unavoidable, but he strongly denounced wholesale rebellion. See
Miller, supra note 206.
246. See supra Part II.B.2.
247. See supra notes 171-173 (discussing Wardlow).
248. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
249. See Ristroph, supra note 20.
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But courts are not entirely comfortable with their role as regulators, either.
Thus, while there are many opinions addressing the constitutionality of seizures,
creating the appearance of close judicial supervision of police, the substance of
those opinions is typically a declination to review. To find an encounter not a
seizure is to decline review. To identify reasonable suspicion or probable cause as
a safe harbor is to decline any further review in the countless cases in which these
minimal levels of suspicion will be present. And to identify flight and resistance
as safe harbors for the use of force has, in practice, meant the declination to review
the entirely unnecessary killings of unarmed men. Each of these declinations to
review is worth questioning; on each issue, federal courts should reassert the power
to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
As this Article has shown, federal courts have avoided reviewing the use of
force closely, sometimes emphasizing that police officers decide to use force in
tense and uncertain circumstances.250 That is true, of course, and perhaps a
reason to refrain from holding officers individually liable. But were our aim to
protect individual rights, the fact that police make decisions in tense and uncertain
circumstances would be an argument for closer ex post review-for an excessive
force doctrine that is at least as protective of victims of force as self-defense
doctrine, which demands that uses of force be necessary and proportionate to the
threat.251 Perhaps it makes sense that cities typically indemnify individual officers
who are sued for excessive force; the officer's split-second decision to use force is
not, in most circumstances, one for which he should be personally liable. We can
separate the question of who pays for excessive force from the question of who
decides whether it was excessive, however. The fact that the officer is not always
the right party to pay damages does not mean that the officer's decision should be
beyond review.
A final word on the distribution of violence. Crafted appropriately, these
doctrinal changes are unlikely to significantly increase risks of physical harm to
police officers. But they would make it harder to arrest individuals, harder to
convict them, harder to punish them. That consequence, some will surely argue,
may increase crime rates and thus increase risks to the public. Without endorsing
the reactionary claim that any reduction in prosecutions and punishments will
jeopardize pubic safety, I do want to urge transparency about the distributive
judgments that inform policing policy and constitutional choices. With respect
to the use of force, our law now embraces something dose to the inverse of
250. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,396-97 (1989).
251. Rachel Harmon has proposed importing necessity, imminence, and proportionality standards from
self-defense doctrine in criminal law into Fourth Amendment use of force doctrine. Harmon,
supra note 16.
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Blackstone's well-known punishment ratio of guilty men to innocent.25 2 Fourth
Amendment doctrine suggests, better ten (one hundred? one thousand?) suspects
be unlawfiully stopped, arrested, or subjected to deadly force than one officer be
harmed or even disobeyed. 2s' And in adopting this view, we have put the lives,
bodies, and dignity of suspects-typically, young black men-on the line.
CONCLUSION
Police violence is a timely subject in 2017, but perhaps it is equally a timeless
one. With a slightly longer historical view, it becomes evident that at least since
police departments became entrenched as American institutions, the use of force
by police officers has captured the nation's attention about once a generation or
so. After broad acceptance of police discretion during the Progressive Era, many
began to worry about police abuses (including "the third degree") in the late
1930s.254 New York reflected the concerns of many jurisdictions when it added
constraints on police authority to its state constitution in 1938.25 Strong critiques
of police authority simmered primarily at the state level until the 1960s, when
violent clashes between law enforcement and protesters (of the Vietnam War, or
of racial inequality) prompted the appointment of a presidential commission and
a close examination of police interactions with minority communities.256 Though
this commission identified the perception that police intrusions were dispropor-
tionately directed against racial minorities, the nation did little to address any
imbalance.257 Instead, the courts continued to expand police authority, until and
252. "[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. Sir Matthew Hale may have actually uttered the phrase
earlier than Blackstone, but it is now Blackstone who gets all the credit. See Harold J. Berman, The
Origins ofHistoricalJurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE LJ. 1651, 1706 n.147 (1994) ("1
had rather through ignorance of the truth of the fact or the unevidence of it acquit ten guilty
persons than condemn one innocent." (quoting Matthew Hale's diary)). Others have opined on
the ideal ratio of freed guilty to punished innocents as well, offering options from 1:1 to more than
1000:1. SeeAlexander Volokh, NGuilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997).
253. Recall Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985): "It is not better that all felony suspects die than
that they escape." Id. at 1. But is it better that they die than that they endanger anyone? The
Garner Court seemed to believe so. "Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force." Id
254. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS
L. REV. 447,493 (2010).
255. See id at 522-23.
256. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968) (also
known as the Kerner Commission).
257. The Kerner Commission found that "Negroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment
occur repeatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably one of the major reasons
for intense Negro resentment against the police." See id at 158. But just a few months after the
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even after Rodney King's videotaped beating brought police violence to the
headlines once again in the early 1990s. The King beating, and the subsequent
acquittal of the officers involved, led to a flurry of academic critiques of police
brutality.2 ss But these critiques did not trace police violence to the underlying
constitutional doctrine, and in the 1990s courts made no substantial efforts to
constrain the authority to use force, much less the underlying authority to conduct
seizures or near-seizures. Indeed, as this Article has shown, since the Warren
Court first began to apply the Fourth Amendment to early stages of police-
civilian interactions, the Supreme Court has steadily expanded the seizure
authority, which of course includes the authority to use violence.
Thus, we should not view recent incidents of police violence as historical
anomalies or as unfortunate but isolated acts of wrongdoing. The officers who
have killed unarmed black men in Chicago, Ferguson, New York, and other
American cities and towns are not bad apples whose removal will solve the problem
of excessive force. Instead, police violence, including lethal violence against
unarmed suspects, is the predictable consequence of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
For decades, American cities and towns have expanded the numbers of police
officers even as courts expand the authority held by each officer. At the same
time, rights of noncompliance and resistance have withered, especially for those
racial groups most likely to be monitored and investigated by the police.
Resistance is, supposedly, what necessitates police force. The mere prospect
of resistance-even in its weakest, passive forms such as noncompliance or
avoidance-licenses officers to use violence. It may seem paradoxical, then, to
suggest that we could reduce police violence by acknowledging and protecting
forms of resistance. But an honest appraisal of the functions of police as "violence
specialists"259 should lead to the realization that forms of resistance can serve as
crucial constraints on these unique agents of state force. By protecting an indi-
vidual's right to resist or avoid the very beginnings of a police encounter, and by
heightening after-the-fact judicial scrutiny of those encounters, we may yet reduce
police violence and its lethal results. At least as importantly, we create opportuni-
ties for those most often targeted by the police to reclaim a measure of autonomy,
dignity, and respect.
Commission's report, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
which acknowledged the racially disparate impacts of police investigations, but expanded police
authority anyway. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also supra Part I.A.
258. See, e.g, SKOLNICK &FYFE, supra note 123.
259. DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HuMAN HISTORY 30-31 (2009).
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